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Abstract 
We present results from six randomized control trials of an integrated approach to improve livelihoods 
amongst the very poor. The approach combines the transfer of a productive asset with consumption 
support, training and coaching plus savings encouragement and health education and/or services. Results 
from the implementation of the same basic program, adapted to a wide variety of geographic and 
institutional contexts and with multiple implementing partners, show statistically significant, cost-
effective impacts on consumption (fueled mostly by increases in self-employment income) and 
psychosocial status of the targeted households. The impact on the poor households lasted at least a year 
after all implementation ended. It is possible to make sustainable improvements in the economic status of 
the poor with a relatively short-term intervention. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
More than one fifth of the world’s population lives on less than Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) US$1.25 a 
day, and there is an emerging international consensus that this share should (and can) be driven close to 
zero by 2030 (1, 2). Reaching this objective will require enabling the poorest families, who are often the 
most marginalized within their villages, to shift from insecure and fragile sources of income to more 
sustainable income-generating activities. One possible avenue, popular with both development 
organizations and governments, is to promote self-employment activities (such as cow rearing or petty 
trading). Past efforts to reduce poverty by encouraging these types of activities among the poor, however, 
have often been plagued by implementation problems and been deemed failures (3). For example, India’s 
Integrated Rural Development Program is believed to have been both poorly targeted and ineffective (4, 
5). However, in recent years, several large non-governmental organizations (prominent international 
northern NGOs such as Oxfam, World Vision and Heifer, as well as many local NGOs) have gone back to 
this “livelihood” approach. This past experience raises the question: is it actually possible to reliably 
improve the livelihoods of the poorest households by giving them access to self-employment activities, or 
is this entire approach flawed? In particular, is it possible to come up with a model for doing so that can 
be implemented by a wide variety of organizations and works in a wide range of geographic, institutional, 
and cultural contexts? 
We present results from randomized control trials (RCTs) in six countries of a particular approach to 
foster self-employment activities amongst the very poor. Originally designed and implemented by BRAC, 
a large Bangladeshi NGO that runs several country-wide programs, the “Graduation” program provides a 
holistic set of services, including the grant of a productive asset, to the poorest households in a village 
(referred to by BRAC as the “ultra-poor”). The beneficiaries are identified through a participatory process 
in a village meeting, followed by a verification visit by the organization’s staff. Selected beneficiaries are 
then given a productive asset that they choose from a list, training and support for the asset they have 
chosen, as well as general life skills coaching, weekly consumption support for some fixed period, and 
typically access to savings accounts and health information or services. These different activities (plus 
regular interactions with the households over the course of a year) are designed to complement each other 
in helping households to start a productive self-employment activity. The idea is to provide a “big push”, 
over a limited period of time, with the hope of unlocking a poverty trap. The program costs per household 
average 100% (range from 62% to 145%) of baseline household consumption. While the program may 
initially be relatively expensive (compared to just providing training, coaching or a cash transfer), the 
thinking behind the program is that the combination of these activities is necessary and sufficient to 
obtain persistent impact on a large fraction of the beneficiaries.  
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We address the “sufficiency” claim: is the Graduation approach effective and cost effective, and can it be 
implemented at scale and in different contexts and cultures? Whether all the ingredients of the program 
are individually necessary is not tackled here and will need to be dealt with in future work. 
A key feature of the BRAC approach is that, while comprehensive, it is well codified, scalable, and 
replicable. BRAC has already implemented the program at scale in Bangladesh. As of 2011, BRAC had 
reached close to 400,000 households, and a further 250,000 were scheduled to be reached between 2012 
and 2016 (6). It has now also been replicated in about twenty countries, including the six countries that 
are studied here. A high-quality RCT, conducted independently but simultaneously with this study, has 
shown the BRAC program in Bangladesh to be very effective (6). Two years after graduation, households 
have expanded their self-employment activities, diversified out of agriculture and livestock, reduced 
casual labor, and increased consumption. Previous non-randomized studies of the BRAC program (7–9) 
found similar impacts.  
Between 2007 and 2014, we conducted a multi-site RCT of the Graduation program. The sites were 
chosen as part of an effort led by Ford Foundation and Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP), 
referred to here as the Graduation Program Consortium. The programs were implemented by six different 
organizations in six countries (Ethiopia, Ghana, Honduras, India, Pakistan, and Peru), but overall 
planning on the programs and evaluation were coordinated from the onset.1 Treatment was randomly 
assigned amongst eligible households. Data were collected at baseline and just after program end, two 
years after the programs began (“endline 1”), and again approximately one year after the end of the 
programs, i.e., about three years after treatment began (“endline 2”). We report pooled results from all the 
sites (21,063adults in 10,495 households) as well as site by site results.   
The main contribution of this study is the evaluation of the cost-effectiveness of the same potentially 
important intervention across a diverse set of contexts. The sites span three continents, and different 
cultures, market access and structures, religions, subsistence activities, and overlap with government 
safety net programs. This diversity should give us a high level of confidence in the robustness of the 
impact to variations in both the context and implementation agency. The core components of the program 
are similar in substance and magnitude, although the program design includes adjustments as are 
necessary for local contexts. For example, country-specific market analysis was conducted to determine 
viable livelihoods to promote, rather than simply promoting the same livelihood in every context. In 
addition, since the study was conceived from the onset as one multi-site study, variables were collected in 
a comparable manner on a broad array of outcomes. Finally, households were surveyed over three years, 
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including one year after the end of the program, which directly speaks to the sustainability of the changes 
we observe.  
II. THE PROGRAM: COMMONALITIES AND VARIATIONS 
The basic approach of the program is to combine six different activities designed to complement each 
other to help households start, and continue with, a self-employment activity. The core of the program is a 
productive asset transfer, but the premise of the program is that the support has to be sufficiently broad 
and long-lasting to ensure that households continue to benefit from that asset into the future. 
   
Following identification of the beneficiary households through a participatory process in the village, the 
six activities are:  
1. Productive asset transfer: a one-time transfer of a productive asset  
2. Consumption support: a regular transfer of food or cash for a few months to about a year2 
3. Technical skills training on managing the particular productive assets 
4. High-frequency home visits  
5. Savings: access to a savings account and in some instances a deposit collection service and/or 
mandatory savings  
6. Some health education, basic health services, and/or life-skills training  
The Graduation Program Consortium organized global learning events at which staff from each of the 
sites, along with researchers, gathered to discuss site-specific design considerations. The Consortium also 
hosted a dedicated website to foster ongoing knowledge exchange between sites and a wider community 
of practice. There were five global learning events between 2008 and 2014, plus several regional 
workshops. The first two global meetings featured exposure visits to the BRAC program in Bangladesh 
and the Bandhan program in India. Each partner thus participated in at least two field visits, with some 
additional exchange visits arranged on an ad hoc basis (e.g., the Ghana team visited the Ethiopia site as 
they designed their program). 
 
We now detail the core components of the program. We first discuss the commonalities across all sites, 
and then discuss the important variations across sites. Table 1 has a detailed description of the program 




The Graduation program is intended to serve the poorest of the poor within villages. The targeting process 
starts with selection of a poor region based on national survey data, and a list of villages within the target 
area (often selected in consultation with program staff). At most program sites, ultra-poor households are 
then identified using a Participatory Wealth Ranking (PWR) during which villagers create an economic 
ranking of all village households. In Indonesia, Alatas et al (11) finds that a PWR used to identify 
recipients of a government program successfully identified the poorer households. The households 
selected for the Graduation program through the PWR are then visited by field officers from the 
implementing organizations to verify their poverty status using an asset checklist (often the Progress out 
of Poverty (PPI) scorecard (12)). 48% of the selected households have daily per capita consumption 
below $1.25, compared to 19% of the population at large in these countries (Table S1a). 
A fraction of households in the resulting list are then randomly assigned to receive the program and are 
invited to participate. In all sites but India, all intended beneficiaries enrolled. We provide more 
discussion of take up in the India program below.  
Productive-Asset Transfer 
The asset transfer is the core component of the program and also one of its largest costs. Each household 
chose, in consultation with the field officer, one of the assets (or asset bundle options) in a list proposed 
by the implementing organization (often, this list was created after hiring local experts to analyze markets 
and the viability of livelihood options). Common choices included raising livestock (sheep, goats, 
chicken, cattle, etc.) and petty trade, and are detailed in Table 1. The value of assets varied between sites, 
ranging from PPP US$451 to PPP US$1228 per household. The differences in transfer costs partially 
reflect the differences in local livestock prices: all but one site (Peru) transferred productive assets worth 
between four to eight goats at local prices (see Table 1 for exact figures). Furthermore, although the asset 
type differed across countries, the principle in choosing the asset was consistent. In four of the six sites, 
the asset transferred was the most or the second most commonly held asset at baseline. In Peru and 
Ethiopia, the most commonly transferred assets were guinea pigs, and sheep and goats, respectively, 
because they were believed to be more profitable than the most commonly held assets. Different assets 
generated quite different cash flow patterns: some produced immediate revenue (e.g., petty trade) whereas 
others (like cows) produced far more delayed and lumpy revenue flows. 
The asset transfer generally happened between zero and 15 months, largely depending on the site, after 
the identification of the beneficiaries and the baseline survey. In Pakistan, where the intervention was run 
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by several organizations, it took several months, and in some cases a year or more, to complete all rounds 
of asset transfers. Honduras also had delays in starting the program. In Ethiopia, the transfers were spread 
out over six months. 
Consumption Support 
Consumption support—generally a cash stipend—was distributed typically weekly or monthly. The 
purpose of the consumption stipend is both to immediately improve and stabilize consumption, and to 
reduce incentives to sell (or eat up) the productive assets being distributed. The distribution of 
consumption support lasted between four and 13 months depending on the site, and ranged from PPP 
US$26 to PPP US$71 per month.3 This variation partly reflects the fact that the PPP in each country is not 
based on the bundle of goods purchased by the poor: in all sites but Ethiopia (where the consumption 
support was part of an existing program), the transfer corresponds roughly to the monetary equivalent of 
between 2,400 and 5,000 calories per day (or roughly a kg of rice at local price) (13).  
Consumption support was provided everywhere, but in two sites (Ethiopia and Peru), a form of 
consumption support already existed before the program started, so it was available for all (Ethiopia) or 
part (Peru) of the control group as well. In Ethiopia, both treatment and control households received 
benefits from the Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP), a food-for-work program for food-insecure 
households. For this reason, the program did not offer any additional consumption support to treatment 
households. In Peru, a conditional cash transfer program, Juntos was active in 51 of the 86 project 
villages. Juntos provides PEN 200 (PPP US$143.33) every two months, on the condition that female 
heads of households meet the following conditions: obtain identity cards for their children, take children 
under five to health check-ups, and send children to school. In the non-Juntos villages, the treatment 
households received a “Juntos-like” consumption support: PEN 100 (PPP US$71.96) per month for nine 
months, conditional on children attending school and receiving health check-ups.  In our sample, 57% of 
control households report receiving support from Juntos during the baseline survey, while all the 
treatment households receive either Juntos or the replacement. Thus, Peru is an intermediate case between 
Ethiopia and the other sites. 
Honduras implemented its consumption support by providing a one-time food transfer intended to cover 
the six month lean season. 
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Training 
Before receiving their assets, households were provided with training on running a business and 
managing their chosen livelihood. For example, those selecting livestock received information on how to 
rear the livestock, including vaccinations, feed and treatment of diseases.  
High-Frequency Home Visits 
Households received regular training and coaching from a field officer throughout the two-year program. 
The visits were intended to provide accountability (i.e., making sure that the households carry out the 
tasks necessary to maintain and grow their livelihood into a stable income-generating activity) as well as 
to be encouraging (e.g., helping households believe that they can have control of their lives and put 
themselves on a path out of extreme poverty) (14). During the home visits field staff provided health 
education and financial capabilities coaching. In Peru, where travelling to the villages proved to be 
logistically challenging, visits happened only every six weeks, and in Pakistan similar difficulties led the 
implementing NGOs to shift gradually to bi-weekly or monthly visits. 
Savings 
Households were encouraged (and in some sites, required) to save in order to improve their ability to cope 
with shocks. This is one component which varied significantly from site to site. Four sites (Ethiopia, 
Honduras, India and Peru) partnered with microfinance institutions able to provide access to savings 
accounts. In Pakistan, households were encouraged to save through savings groups, and in Ghana, 
households received savings accounts. In India and Ghana, individuals were able to save at program 
meetings or with a visit by a field agent, but in the other four sites households had to make deposits at the 
financial institution. 
In Honduras, savings was further encouraged through financial incentives. Beneficiary households 
opened a savings account and were randomized into two groups: (1) savings matching biannually equal to 
50% of the average account balance, or (2) monthly direct savings transfers. Both groups received savings 
incentives equal to a maximum value of HNL 800 (PPP US$90.42). We do not analyze this experimental 
variation in this paper. 
Ethiopia had a strong forced savings component. The government prohibited unconditional transfers to 
the poor. To satisfy this prohibition but still implement the program, the implementing partner, Relief 
Society of Tigray (REST) and the government agreed to allow the asset transfers to be described as “like” 
a loan, as recipients had to make deposits into a savings account in exchange for receiving the asset. 
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Households were not able to withdraw their savings from the account until they saved an amount equal to 
ETB 4,724 (PPP US$1,228), the value of the asset transfer. However, once households achieved the 
required savings threshold, they had full access to their deposits and could withdraw from their accounts 
as they saw fit. Furthermore, if they failed to make the deposits, they did not forfeit their asset. 
Compliance with the deposits was very high, with only 15 households (out of 458) not fulfilling the 
commitment.  
Health and other services 
Finally, all sites but one (Ethiopia) included a health component such as health, nutrition, and hygiene 
training. Some sites also facilitated access to health care, either as direct services from community health 
workers, referring them to government or NGO health clinics, or by enrolling beneficiaries in national 
health insurance. Several of the sites organized support from village assistance committees comprised of 
village leaders who helped advise the households, mediated problems, and connected beneficiaries with 
additional services. 
III. EXPERIMENTAL METHODS 
a. Experimental design 
Of the six experiments, three are individual randomized trials with randomization at the household level 
within each village (India, Ethiopia and Pakistan) and three are clustered randomized trials, with 
randomization at both the village and household level (Ghana, Honduras, and Peru). In the countries with 
clustered randomization, villages were randomly selected to be treatment or control villages, and then 
treatment households were randomly selected within the set of eligible households in treatment villages.  
The goal of this design was to be able to measure spillovers. For the main analysis in this paper, we 
ignore possible externalities and include all control households (within villages or across villages). In 
section IV we provide a discussion of whether any spillovers within the sample may bias our results. 
Randomization was either carried out remotely by the research team (using a computer), or on-site via a 
public lottery.  
One site (Ghana) had a more complex design with two additional treatment groups (savings only, and 
productive asset grant only) to “unpack” those aspects of the intervention. In this paper we are using only 
the group that received the pooled intervention. This is because none of the other studies systematically 
tried to unpack the effects and therefore even with the full Ghana results we would have just one “data-
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point” and would not be able to answer the unpacking questions with anything approaching the degree of 
confidence that we have about the overall program effect.  
The sample size used in the analysis varies from 925 households (Ethiopia) to 2,606 households (Ghana) 
from site to site. The overall sample size pooling all sites is 10,495 households.  
Table 2 provides details by site of key experimental design features, including sample sizes, and Figure 1 
provides a timeline for the typical implementation of both the program and the data collection, and Figure 
S1 provides a timeline for each site. 
b. Integrity of the experimental design 
Balance 
Table S1b presents baseline data for the same variables and indices used as the primary outcome 
measures. Panel A presents the mean comparisons and t-tests for equality of means. At baseline we fail to 
reject at the 5% level the equality of means of treatment and control groups for any of the ten primary 
outcome measures. Panel B presents similar analysis, but with a regression framework that includes fixed 
effects by country, and finds similar balances. The aggregate test, reported in Panel C, finds that we are 
not able to reject equality of means across all ten measures (p-value = 0.689) Tables S1c-S1e present 
similar results for each country. Overall, the sample balance was good in every individual country.  
Survey Attrition 
Table S1f presents an analysis of survey attrition for both endlines 1 and 2. The follow up rate was 
excellent.  We re-surveyed 94% of baseline respondents in endline 1, and 91% in endline 2 (Panel A). 
Panel B presents analysis on the type of people that were more likely to be resurveyed. Panel C presents a 
test of whether the treatment affected the type of person who completed the endline surveys, i.e., whether 
the treatment caused a sample composition bias. The p-values on a full set of baseline characteristics 
interacted with treatment are 0.75 (endline 1) and 0.17 (endline 2), thus supporting the contention that the 
survey attrition did not lead to a different sample frame across treatment and control groups.4 Tables S1g 
and S1h present similar results for each country. At 17%, attrition was the worst in India in endline 1; 
Pakistan was the worst at endline 2, at 21%. In neither country was attrition differential in the treatment 
group.  
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Compliance with treatment assignment 
In all sites but one, the experimental design was strictly adhered to: no control received the program, and 
all treatment households received the program. The India site was the only site in which some individuals 
refused participation: 52% of those selected in the randomization participated in the program. According 
to Bandhan, the implementing organization, 35% of households declined the offer, for two unrelated 
reasons: first, in some villages, a section of villagers held the (erroneous) belief that Bandhan was a 
Christian organization trying to convert beneficiaries, and acceptance of the livestock constituted agreeing 
in some way to participating in Christian rituals.  Second, some wives were worried that their husband 
would mishandle the asset and they would lose face in front of their village. A further 13% were deemed 
ineligible by Bandhan because they were participating in microcredit or self-help group activities. The 
analysis below is an “intention to treat”: we compare households assigned to control to those assigned to 
treatment, irrespective of whether they received treatment or not. 
c. Analysis methods for pooled results 
Following standard practice in the analysis of multi-site trials, we estimate a single model, with strata and 
country dummies. Each column of each table represents the results of a separate OLS regression of the 
form 
 ௜ܻ௞ ൌ 	ߙ	 ൅	ߚଵܽݏݏ݅݃݊݉݁݊ݐ௜ ൅	ߚଶܼ௜௞ ൅	ࢀࢉ࢕࢛࢔࢚࢘࢟ ൅	ࢁ࢙ࢎ࢕࢚࢙࢛࢘࢘࢜ࢋ࢙࢟ ൅ ࢂ࢙࢚࢘ࢇ࢚࢏ࢌ࢏ࢉࢇ࢚࢏࢕࢔ ൅	ߝ௜          (1) 
where ௜ܻ௞ is the outcome k of interest for either household or adult i (details of the variable constructions 
are presented in the SOM Text 1-3), ܽݏݏ݅݃݊݉݁݊ݐ௜	is an indicator for having been randomly selected into 
the program, ܼ௜௞	is the household or adult’s baseline value of the outcome variable k (coded as zero, with 
an indicator for missing baseline, whenever it was not available), ࢀࢉ࢕࢛࢔࢚࢘࢟ is a vector of dummy variables 
for each of the countries in the study, ࢁ࢙ࢎ࢕࢚࢙࢛࢘࢘࢜ࢋ࢙࢟ is a vector of dummy variables indicating whether or 
not the household was surveyed in a short survey round (in some countries, data was collected through 
both long and short surveys), and ࢂ࢙࢚࢘ࢇ࢚࢏ࢌ࢏ࢉࢇ࢚࢏࢕࢔ is the vector of all variables included in stratification in 
each of the six countries.5  
In the main analysis of the pooled sample, no adjustments are made to reflect the differences in sample 
sizes between countries; every observation is weighted equally. Again, this follows standard practice in 
the analysis of multi-site RCTs. Regressions that instead weigh each country equally generate similar 
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results. For each variable we report, we also present the result of a test for equality of the effects across 
sites (which we discuss in the next subsection).   
Because of the comprehensive nature of the program, a large number of outcome variables are reported. 
Therefore, we expect some of the variables to show significant results due to chance. To avoid over-
emphasis on any single significant result, we take several steps. First, following Kling et al (15), for each 
“family” of outcomes, we report an index of all of the outcomes taken together, which we report in Table 
3. This is our main results table. We construct indices first by defining each outcome ௜ܻ௝௟௞ 	(outcome k, for 
observation i in family j, within country l) so that higher values correspond to better outcomes. Then we 
standardize each outcome into a z-score, by subtracting the country control group mean at the 
corresponding survey round and dividing by the country l’s control group standard deviation at the 
corresponding survey round. We then average all the z-scores, and again standardize to the control group 
within each country and round.6  
Second, given that multiple families of outcomes are being reported, we correct for the potential issue of 
simultaneous inference using multiple inference testing. We calculate q-values using the Benjamini-
Hochberg step-up method (10) to control for the false discovery rate (FDR). We follow the procedure 
outlined in Anderson (16), and test α at all significance levels (1.000, 0.999, 0.998… 0.000). Our q-value 
is the smallest α at which the null hypothesis is rejected. It is reported in Table 3.7  
IV. RESULTS 
a. Pooled sample  
Table 3 (both endlines), Figure S2 (endline 1) and Figure 2 (endline 2) present an overview of the results 
pooled across all sites. Table 3 shows the results aggregated by “families”, including q-values corrected 
for the fact that we are presenting the results from 10 indices.8 
At endline 1 (year two of the study, just after the end of the program in most sites), all the families of 
outcomes have improved in the treatment group (compared to the control group). We use two outcome 
measures for consumption: per-capita consumption increases by 0.12 standard deviations (q-value 0.001), 
which is equivalent to PPP US$4.55 per capita per month, or roughly 5% of control group mean of PPP 
US$78.80, and an index of food security increases by 0.11 standard deviations (q-value 0.001). An index 
of productive and household assets increases by 0.26 standard deviations (q-value 0.001). Household 
income and revenues increase by 0.38 standard deviations (q-value 0.001). There are also improvements 
in personal lives: physical health improves by 0.034 standard deviations (q-value 0.078), and mental 
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health improves by 0.10 standard deviations (q-value 0.001). Political involvement increases by 0.064 (q-
value 0.001), and women’s empowerment by 0.046 (q-value 0.049). 
By endline 2 (year three of the study, typically one year after the program ended), all the effects on 
economic variables are still significant, and usually similar to or larger than after endline 1. It is striking 
that there is no evidence of mean reversion in the per capita consumption, food security or assets. The 
gains in financial inclusion, total time spent working, income and revenue, and mental health have 
declined but are still positive and statistically significant. The gains in physical health and women’s 
empowerment have declined and are no longer statistically significant. 
Figure S2 and Figure 2, which present the variable-by-variable results at a glance, tell a similar story: the 
indices are not driven by specific variables. Most individual variables show significant impacts at endline 
1. At endline 2, most variables stay significant, and the various variables in the women’s decision-making 
families and the mental health families have either declined or become not significant.  
Tables S2a to S2h contain the detailed variable-by-variable results for the entire sample.  
In Table S2a, we see that food consumption increases more than non-food consumption, both in absolute 
value and in proportion (specifically, food consumption increases 7.5% from a control group mean of 
$51.60, and non-food consumption increases 2.4% from a control group mean of $25.30). The elasticity 
of food consumption to overall expenditure appears to be greater than one, a striking result given prior 
estimates that find estimates well below one (17). Durable goods expenditures do not increase 
significantly in either time period, but we do see treatment households have more household assets than 
the control households in both periods (Table S2c), so the expenditure variable may fail to pick up some 
durable goods expenditures. The consequence of the increase in food expenditure is a greater sense of 
food security (Table S2b), which is as strong in endline 2 as in endline 1 (for example, 14% reported at 
least one person not eating at all for an entire day, compared to 17% in the control group, Table S2b 
Column 3). 
In Table S2c, we see that households have statistically significantly more assets both in endline 1 and in 
endline 2. The asset index we construct in all countries is 0.26 standard deviations larger in endline 1 and 
0.25 standard deviations larger in endline 2. Likewise, the effect size for productive assets (those used in 
household self-employment activities) does not change between endlines 1 and 2, with an effect size of 
0.27 standard deviations at endline 1 and 0.25 standard deviations at endline 2. There is an increase both 
in household and productive assets, but the increase in productive assets is larger in both years 
(productive asset value increases by 15.1% and 13.6% compared to control group means of PPP US$1964 
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and PPP US$1576 in endline 1 and 2, respectively). Row 12 of Table 4 compares the value of the assets 
held by households by year 3 to the value of the asset that was transferred to them. In general, the impact 
of the program on asset values is lower than the cost of the assets (Ethiopia is the exception). However, 
the program impact on asset holdings is stable from year 2 to year 3 (Table 3), so after the households 
made an initial adjustment to asset holdings, there was no further decline.  
The increase in asset holding does not come at the expense of more borrowing or less savings. Instead, we 
see in Table S2d large increase in savings in both endlines (PPP US$151, or 155.5% of control mean in 
endline 1, and PPP US$75, or 95.7% of control means in endline 2). Savings was mandatory during the 
first year in many sites, so it is not entirely surprising that we see an increase at endline 1. But continued 
savings was not required after the program, and the increase in net savings is still large.   
These productive assets are being put to use: adult labor supply increases by 17.5 minutes per adult per 
day (10.4% increase over control households) at endline 1, and 11.2 minutes (6.1% increase) at endline 2 
(Table S2e). The increase is concentrated on livestock and agricultural activities, consistent with the 
assets chosen by most people. More assets and more labor translate into increased revenue from livestock 
(Table S2f, Column 1)9 and net income from agriculture (Column 2). At endline 1, the revenue from 
livestock is 41.6% larger, compared to a control group mean of PPP US$73.50). At endline 2 it is 37.5% 
larger, compared to a control group mean of PPP US$80.60. The households also feel better off 
economically: 0.33 points improvement on a scale of 1 to 10 at endline 1 (control group mean = 3.74), 
and 0.30 points improvement at endline 2 (control group mean = 3.65). All of the gains to income and 
revenue persist one year after the end of the program, including the increase in self-reported economic 
status.  
Table S2g presents the detailed health and mental health results. The only significant positive impact on 
physical health seen at either endline at the 5% level is on the activities of daily living score at endline 1. 
At endline 1, the mental health index is 0.099 standard deviations higher, driven by the overall self-
reported happiness and lack of symptoms of mental distress.10 By endline 2, the positive impact on the 
mental health index has declined to 0.071 standard deviations, but it remains significantly positive and 
continues to be driven by both self-reported happiness and lack of stress. This minor decrease in the 
treatment effect may be another instance of the well-known “hedonic treadmill” (18). 
Table S2h presents results on political and social empowerment, and women’s empowerment within the 
household. Beneficiaries, who are at the outset often marginalized within their village, become more 
likely to be involved in political activity (except voting) and village-level actions. This improvement is 
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true both immediately after the program ends and one year later. At endline 1, treatment women report 
having a greater say in decisions within the household related to health expenditures and home 
improvements. However, this gain in empowerment does not persist over time. 
In Table S3, we present bounds for our treatment effects, depending on different assumption with respect 
to attrition, using Horowitz-Manski-Lee bounds (19, 20). The conclusions are robust to this exercise, with 
all lower bounds except that for women empowerment significantly positive at endline 1. 
b. Country-by-Country variation  
There are too many countries and too many variables to comment on the country-by-country and variable-
by-variable results in detail, though the tables are all available in the supplementary material. Figure S3 
(endline 1) and Figure 3 (endline 2) have a similar format to Figure S2 and Figure 2, but they present the 
country-by country results for the summary indices. Tables S4a through S4f present the impacts on the 10 
indexed family outcomes, one table per country. Tables S5a-1 through S5h-2 present the impacts on each 
of the components in each of the countries, one table per family of outcomes per endline. Here, we 
highlight some particularly relevant information from this analysis. 
The first and most important point is that the results are not driven by any one country. The differences 
across countries can be seen in Figure S3 and Figure 3. We present tests for the hypothesis that the results 
are the same for all countries for each outcome variable. The hypothesis is rejected for almost all pooled 
outcomes (Table 3), which suggests that there is significant site-by-site variation (and enough data to pick 
it up), which would be important to study in future work. However, in endline 1 the program appears to 
have positive impacts on most indices for most countries (Tables S4a-S4f). An exception is Peru, where 
we see three results out of ten statistically significant at the 5% level. In endline 2, four of the countries 
(Ethiopia, Ghana, India and Pakistan) continue to have statistically significant and positive impacts on 
most variables, but Honduras and Peru have weaker results, with positive and statistically significant 
impacts on three out of ten and four out of ten families of outcomes before multiple hypothesis 
adjustments, respectively (and Honduras also has a negative, and statistically significant prior to multiple 
hypothesis adjustment, impact on assets). 
Turning to the key variables, the gains in per capita consumption, for example, are statistically significant 
for both endlines in every country except Honduras and Peru. However, we do find a statistically 
significant increase in food consumption for Honduras in endline 1 and Peru in endline 2 (Tables S5a-1 
and S5a-2). Likewise there is an increase in livestock revenues (livestock was the most frequently chosen 
asset in all sites) in all countries by endline 2. There is significant improvement in assets in all countries 
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except Honduras (where it actually declines by endline 2). When looking at the variables individually, 
some results are different from country to country, no doubt partly due to local specificities and probably 
partly due to pure luck, but the overall bottom line is that the program appears to be effective in most 
places. Even in Peru, where we see gains on fewer variables than in other countries, the gains in food 
expenditures per capita, assets, livestock revenues, physical health and mental health, are all positive and 
significant. 
Second, while it is of course dangerous to rationalize the Honduras results ex-post, there is a relatively 
simple explanation for the pattern of results we observe, with generally positive results in endline 1 
declining by endline 2. Most households were given chickens. In both endlines we do see an increase in 
revenue coming from chickens, as well as a significant increase in food consumption. However, a large 
fraction of the chickens died due to illness. By the time households were interviewed at endline 2, the 
households had lost most of their productive asset (leading to a negative and statistically significant 
impact on the asset index by endline 2) and were not consuming more. 
Third, the India results, which come from West Bengal, an area of India that is directly abutting 
Bangladesh and shares a language and a culture, are strikingly similar, down to most details, to the results 
in the RCT of the impact of BRAC reported in Bandiera et al (6). In particular, as they do, we find that 
there is an increase in non-agricultural, non-livestock income by endline 2 in West Bengal (Table S5f-2). 
None of these were promoted through the program, yet they materialized as the household’s wellbeing 
improved.11 This result suggests a pathway—income diversification—through which the results might 
persist over time.  
Fourth, the strongest positive results across the board are obtained in Ethiopia. The Ethiopia case is 
interesting, because it is the one country where all of the control group also received the basic 
consumption support that, in other sites, is only provided to the treatment groups (in Peru, half of the 
control group was also on a government cash transfer program, Juntos). Since it is only one country, we 
have no counterfactual to what would have happened in Ethiopia if the control group had not received 
consumption support, but this design at least tells us that the consumption support on its own is not 
responsible for the entire impact of the program. Note however that the productive asset transfer in 
Ethiopia (equivalent to 7.98 goats) was also larger than in Ghana (6.00 goat equivalents), India (6.53 goat 
equivalents), or Pakistan (3.75 goat equivalents), so to the extent that assets are liquid, the larger asset 
transfer in Ethiopia may have compensated for the difference in consumption support. 
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c. Effects on distribution of outcomes 
Table 5 shows quantile regression estimates at the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 90th quantiles of the distribution 
of the outcomes. There are several notable results. First, we see positive and significant impacts on 
income, consumption and assets, at all tested quantiles. This is encouraging, in that it shows that the 
program did not push the poorest towards an activity that they did not have the wherewithal to manage 
successfully. Second, for the other variables, the pattern of results is what standard theory would predict. 
For example we see impacts on food security only towards the bottom (at the 25th percentile): those are 
the households who frequently miss meals and thus likely use any income gains to buy more food. On the 
other hand, we see impacts on financial inclusion only for the top quantiles (median and above at both 
endlines): if either access to credit or savings requires meeting some threshold of resources, the poorest of 
the poor may not have met that threshold even with the program. Third, the effects on consumption per 
capita and the income and revenues index are all increasing with the quantiles: for example, at endline 1, 
the 10th percentile of consumption (income and revenue index) increases by 0.027 SD (0.005 SD), while 
the 90th percentile increases by 0.491 SD (0.079 SD). Finally, we do see much larger asset growth at 
higher quantiles (0.038 SD for the 10th quantile vs 0.357 for the 90th quantile). 
d. Are Spillovers biasing the Results?  
In SOM Text 4 and Tables S6a and S6b, we examine spillover results in Ghana, Honduras and Peru. 
These three sites employed a randomization at both the village and household levels to permit 
comparisons of control individuals in treatment villages to control individuals in control villages. Overall, 
these results suggest that neither externalities nor general equilibrium effects within villages significantly 
affect our outcomes. This finding implies it is appropriate to pool the control households in treatment 
villages with the households in control villages to form the control group.  
V. DISCUSSION 
The experiment, conducted in six countries on three continents, shows that the ultra-poor Graduation 
program improves the lives of the very poor along many dimensions. The program’s primary goal, to 
increase consumption, is achieved by the conclusion of the program and maintained one year later. 
Furthermore, the pattern of impacts on intermediate and downstream outcomes accords with the theory of 
change: productive assets, income and revenue go up. While results vary across countries, the general 
pattern of positive effects that persist for at least a year after the program concludes is common across all 
countries, with weaker impacts in Honduras and Peru.   
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a. Cost benefit analysis  
Naturally the benefits should not be considered without also considering the costs. Table 4, Panel A 
presents costing details, broken down by direct costs (direct transfer and supervision costs), start-up 
expenses and indirect costs (including local and international overhead costs). The total program costs for 
the full duration of the program (inflated to year 3 equivalent PPP dollars, using 5% as the social discount 
rate range from PPP US$1538 per household (India) to PPP US$5742 (Peru). We use 5% as the social 
discount rate to harmonize with the joint World Bank and International Monetary Fund policy (21), but 
also calculate internal rates of return and show sensitivity to 7% and 10%. There is no single driver of 
costs to explain the differences; some of it can be attributed to in-country operating cost differences and 
some is presumably due to variations in the actual program design. Peru, for example, is a much richer 
country than India, so the wages paid to the implementing staff were a lot higher. It is not possible to 
precisely assign labor costs to specific activities; however, the majority of supervision costs in each 
country are likely attributable to the household visits and training activities. The asset costs and food 
stipends, on the other hand, required little labor to distribute. 
Table 4, Panel B summarizes the consumption gains and asset value changes attributable to the program, 
all inflated to year 3 equivalent PPP dollars. We assume that the (unmeasured) year 1 ITT effect on per-
capita consumption is equal to that estimated for year 2, and we assume that the estimated impact on year 
3 consumption continues indefinitely into the future (we then relax this assumption, below, as a 
sensitivity check). The overall impact of the program on consumption expenditure, reported in row 8, is 
the sum of the impact on the year 3 stock of household durables and the total impact on each year’s non-
durable consumption (in year 3 equivalent dollars). Rows 9 and 10 of Panel B also report the impact of 
the programs on the stock of productive assets and savings.  
As noted previously, the increase in assets held by the households is lower than the value of the asset in 
all countries but Ethiopia. On average, households have drawn down part of the asset transfer in the first 
year, but there is no further decline between year 1 and year 2, and the consumption gains (the final 
objective of the programs) persist over time. The decline in asset holding in the first year, followed by a 
stable pattern in both assets and consumption is somewhat surprising, as economic theory would suggest 
a slower adjustment to a steady state level of assets (even if the initial transfer was larger than the optimal 
steady state level of assets). We may capture imperfectly some informal assets or liabilities (such as debt 
or loans to or from other households in the village, which may be labeled as gifts or alms). We also do not 
capture the value of human capital, which has increased due to better nutrition, physical and mental 
  18
health: spending on better food and needed health expenditures early in the program may have been a 
valuable investment.  
Of course, the ultimate goal of the program is to durably increase consumption, not merely to increase 
asset holding. Using total consumption as the measure for benefits, the total benefit-cost ratios presented 
in row 11 indicate that with the exception of Honduras, the programs all have benefits greater than their 
costs (ranging from 133% in Ghana to 410% in India).  
We explore the sensitivity of this conclusion to some of our crucial assumptions. First, we calculate the 
internal rate of return, to assess at what social discount rate costs equal benefits. They are 13.3% 
(Ethiopia), 6.9% (Ghana), n/a (Honduras), 23.4% (India), 9.5% (Pakistan), and 7.5% (Peru). Second, we 
calculate in row 18 the rate at which nondurable consumption must dissipate after year 3 (rather than 
persist into the future) in order for benefits to equal costs. Third, in the subsequent two rows, 19 and 20, 
we show the sensitivity of the benefit-cost ratio to alternative social discount rates of 7% and 10%. 
Benefits continue into the future while the costs are front-loaded, so the benefit-cost ratios decline with 
increases in the assumed social discount rate. See SOM Text 5 for details on the cost-benefit analysis 
calculations. 
b. Mechanisms 
As mentioned, the results echo the positive results of the evaluation of the BRAC program in Bangladesh 
(6). Two other studies of cash transfers and support for self-employment, both in Uganda, find similar 
results. Blattman et al (22) finds that a program that provided a $150 grant (PPP US$401) towards a non-
farming self-employment activity along with training and follow-up guidance to very poor women in 
conflict-affected regions increased consumption, cash earnings, labor supply, and non-farm self-
employment. Blattman et al (23) finds that a program that provided both training and support and a cash 
grant to youth  increased business assets by 57%, work hours by 17% and earnings by 38%. The  
programs we studied differ from those reported on in (22) and (23) on a few dimensions: choice of sample 
frame (representative ultra-poor, versus unemployed young men or poor women); the level of intervention 
(household, versus group-level investments as in (23)); and the integration of other components (health 
and access to savings). Nevertheless, these studies add to an emerging picture from a variety of countries 
that these types of programs can be effective. 
While we see impacts across the board, more work is needed on the mechanisms that underlie the positive 
impacts. The core fact is that a time-limited big push led to a sustained increase in consumption and 
income. One common way to think about the effect of a big push is through the lens of the large, 
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primarily theoretical, literature on poverty traps (24). In such models the combination of constraints and 
incentives faced by the poor act to keep them in place, ensuring that any small improvement in their 
wellbeing quickly dissipates. Only a big push that significantly relaxes those constraints can set off a 
virtuous cycle where the beneficiaries move to an entirely different trajectory.  
The fact that the effects of the program seem durable supports the interpretation that the program 
unlocked a poverty trap. On the other hand, the average effects are not very large and do not correspond 
to our intuitive sense of what it would mean to be liberated from the trap of poverty. There are several 
possible ways to resolve this tension:  
First, it could be that there is no trap—but rather what one might call a “poverty flat”, a world in which 
small changes persist but neither unleash continued improvement, thus leading to large longer term 
changes, nor dissipate rapidly. 
Second, it is possible that this particular trap is small—the beneficiaries have gotten out of it, only to join 
the broader mass of the poor, who might be in some other, bigger, trap.  
Third, it is worth recalling that the theory predicts that the effect of a push will be heterogeneous, unless 
the push is simply enormous. Those who are closer to the edge of the trap will exit, but the rest will just 
slowly fall back in. Perhaps this is what happened—the heterogeneity in the impacts we see across the 
distribution lend some support to this hypothesis. Even among the very poor households targeted by these 
programs, the impacts on income and revenues and consumption, while positive everywhere, are lower at 
the bottom of the distribution. Since everyone was offered the same menu of assets, under the standard 
assumptions of constant or decreasing returns to the assets and homotheticity of preferences, we would 
expect those impacts to be either constant or decreasing. Instead, it appears that the poorest of the poor 
either have a lower return to the asset, or that they chose to consume more of it, or both. The differences 
in terms of final asset accumulation are very large: by endline 2, the point estimate of the impact of the 
program at the 90th percentile of the asset index is more than ten times that at the 10th percentile. 
Fourth, another source of heterogeneity, the level of patience or return on investment, could also help 
explain why the average impact is both durable and yet not very large. The more patient or productive 
would use the asset transfer as a springboard to accumulate more assets and permanently be on a different 
consumption trajectory, while the others would sell off some part of the transferred assets to consume 
more than they earn, and perhaps eventually end up where they started. In rows 13-17 of Table 5, we use 
quantile treatment effects to generate the total gain in assets at different quantiles and present them 
relative to value of the original transfer. The ratio of the asset gain to the cost of the transfer is less than 
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one at all tested quantiles in every country except Ethiopia (above one for the 50th, 75th and 90th 
percentiles) and India (above one for the 90th percentile), suggesting that the general pattern of eating into 
assets holds at every quantile. Therefore, we do not find strong evidence for this kind of heterogeneity. 
But what would be the specific nature of a trap? One standard narrative for a poverty trap essentially says 
that poor people remain poor because they cannot afford enough food to make them strong enough to be 
productive (25). This theory has been discounted in recent years on grounds of empirical plausibility—
essentially most poor people can afford to spend more on food if that were a priority for them (26). 
However, this may be a case where that theory does apply, at least to some participants in the program, 
because these people are poorer than most poor people and may actually not be able to afford enough 
food (Table 1 reports the daily per-capita calories that could be purchased if baseline expenditures were 
allocated solely to staple grains). As noted, for the very poor, we do see large increases in food security. 
Moreover, the elasticity of food consumption is greater than one in the overall experimental population. 
However this is driven by the food expenditure responses in Ghana, Honduras, and Peru. In the three 
other countries, the proportional increase in non-food consumption is either similar to or greater than the 
proportional increase in food consumption, and we see a persistent effect there as well. Moreover, we see 
even larger and persistent impact even at the quantiles where there is no impact on food security 
(although it could still be that they are eating more nutritional food). So nutrition cannot be the whole 
story, although it may well be a part. 
An alternative view of the poverty trap emphasizes underinvestment by the poor, either because they are 
unable to borrow enough to be able to make the necessary investment or because they find it too risky 
(24, 27, 28). For the poorest within our study, we do not find an impact on financial inclusion, and we 
find a weaker impact on assets. This is consistent with the need to satisfy some asset threshold before 
being eligible for credit, one of the key ingredients for a credit-based poverty trap. Once again, however, 
the evidence for the existence of such traps is not very strong. There is a growing body of evidence now 
on microcredit which was intended to improve credit access among the segment of the population only 
slightly less poor than our targeted group. For example, Banerjee et al (29) reviews six randomized 
studies of microcredit in six different countries (30–35) and concludes that while microcredit loans 
sometimes lead to an increase in business activity, the effect on average business profits is much more 
muted, and there is no effect of an impact on consumption over a one to three year time period. In other 
words, for the average poor person, better access to microcredit does not seem to generate the kind of 
sustained consumption gains that we see with this program, suggesting credit alone is not the explanation.   
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Of course the programs we analyze are different from microcredit in multiple ways. Here, households did 
not need to repay. This might have encouraged them to take more risks and genuinely invest themselves 
in the activity. Or it could be the training and personal encouragement. Or these people may be in a 
different economic position—the microcredit borrowers already have an occupation and an income and 
are merely trying to expand, not start a new activity. The participants in the Graduation programs are 
starting new activities, more or less from nothing. These are all important possibilities that deserve 
exploration. 
But perhaps we need to go beyond these standard theories. There are now behavioral theories of poverty 
traps that give an important role to positive expectations of the future (36, 37). We do see some 
improvement in the self-reported well-being of the beneficiaries, which, at endline 1, are visible at all 
level of the distribution except for the 90th percentile. Much more detailed psychological measurement 
would be necessary to fully understand this result and its underlying mechanisms. Perhaps this program 
worked by making the beneficiaries feel that they mattered, that the rest of society cared about them, that 
with this initial help they now had some control over their future wellbeing, and therefore, the future 
could be better. 
These positive results leave us with a number of important questions. First, is it better to deliver physical 
assets and support, rather than pure cash transfers? There is evidence—from an RCT evaluation of the 
GiveDirectly program in Kenya, which transferred on average PPP US$720 to poor households, either 
monthly or in one lump sum—that pure cash transfers also have positive impacts on consumption, food 
security, asset holdings in the short run (including productive assets) and on psychological well-being 
(38). Similarly, de Mel et al (39) finds that a cash (or in-kind) transfer to existing self-employed 
individuals in Sri Lanka has a persistent positive effect on self-employment profits 4.5 to 5.5 years later. 
Since it is cheaper and easier to just deliver cash rather than physical assets and training, and the initial 
consumption increases from Kenya seem to be higher than what we observe after two and three years, it 
would be useful to have a direct comparison of the effects of these programs. The Ghana experimental 
design does include a comparison of the Graduation program to merely an asset transfer and the results 
are forthcoming.  
However, the Kenya results are unfortunately not quite comparable, because the time to follow up was 
much shorter (four months). The Kenya study did employ random variation in survey timing to try to 
examine persistence of the impact, and found that the estimated treatment effect reduced by about half 
from one month after the transfer to seven months, however, this reduction was not statistically 
significant. We observe no decline in the gain in consumption per capita almost three years after the asset 
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transfer. If the effects of one-time transfers dissipate rapidly in one case and are permanent in the other, 
this obviously has major consequences for the comparative cost-benefit analyses of the two programs. 
The evolution of the impacts over time over a longer horizon is thus something that needs to be further 
explored, both for pure cash transfer programs and for these broader programs.  
Second, how important was the training and coaching as a component in the full intervention? This is a 
particularly important component to test, because its costs are on average twice that of the direct transfer 
costs, and because operating at scale requires quality hiring, training and staff supervision. As discussed 
above, we do not have experimental variation with which to test this question. Evidence from elsewhere 
suggests that the household visits, which are a large expenditure, may not be a cost effective component. 
In Blattman et al (22), for example, variation between zero and five household visits did not generate, 
after nine months, large differences in income outcomes (but did lead to higher investment). Furthermore, 
a meta-analysis of self-employment training programs has found mixed but rarely transformative impacts 
from training (40). 
This brings us to the next key question: how long will these results persist? This will not be known until 
some participants are followed for a longer period of time, but there are a number of encouraging signs. 
First, the effect on consumption does not decline over time as one would have expected had the program 
not led to long-term increases in income. Similarly, the increase in consumption was not generated by 
merely spending down the asset provided.12 Second, treatment households have more productive assets 
and have increased their labor supply one year after the program ends, and in some countries have 
diversified out of the original asset that was provided. Finally, in Bangladesh (3), households were 
followed for two more years after the end of the period of support, and the study continues to find robust 
impacts on consumption, productive assets, and earnings.  
Another issue is the potential for externalities or general equilibrium effects, both positive and negative, 
from the program. Transferring (often) the same productive asset to many households in a small village 
may generate a negative externality on other asset owners, if for example the transfers result in a fall in 
the price of cows or milk. On the other hand, the benefits that accrue to the treatment households may be 
shared with others, as has been observed from a conditional cash transfer program in Mexico (41). It is 
worth pointing out that the program is designed to serve few people (the poorest) within each village, and 
in that sense, the current design probably picks up a fair share of the possible externalities. In endline 2, 
the evidence from the three sites where randomization allowed the examination of spillover shows no 
effects on primary economic outcomes such as consumption and income, and no significant effects at the 
5% level on any variable after accounting for multiple hypothesis testing. 
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These questions will become ever more important as these programs scale. The programs studied here 
were implemented at relatively small scale, and typically by NGOs. Moving forward, to reach the largest 
numbers of very poor households, either governments will have to implement the programs or 
governments will fund implementation via subcontracts to local NGOs). Note that implementing the 
program at larger scale will mainly require increasing geographic coverage, rather than increasing the 
proportion of households reached in each village. This suggests that the smallish general equilibrium 
effects observed here are probably also representative of what one would expect from a larger program. 
Hence, the positive impacts generated by these programs are likely to be predictive of what a government 
could expect, if implemented similarly but at larger scale.  
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1 In total, 10 sites were identified and programs implemented. Four are not included here for the following reasons: 
Yemen conducted a randomized evaluation, but has been delayed due to the civil conflict; a second India site, 
implemented by the microlender SKS, also conducted a randomized evaluation, but by a different set of researchers. 
It has not been included due to lack of comparability of data. They find no impact, due either to mis-targeting 
individuals engaged in the labor markets, thus the grants generated substitution away from other income-generating 
activity; portfolio reallocation, in which productive asset grants were sold to pay down debt; or other data issues 
leading to lack of conclusive evidence (10)). Two sites (Haiti, implemented by Fonkoze, and a second in West 
Bengal, India, implemented by Trickle-Up), did not employ experimental methods to measure their impact, and are 
thus not reported here. Ford and CGAP also coordinated ethnographic research in several of the sites. 
2 In Ghana, households received consumption support during the six month lean season for both years. They 
therefore received consumption support over the course of two years, but the total duration of support received was 
14 months. 
3 All exchange rates used in this paper are in PPP terms. We convert all monetary figures from local currency to 
USD PPP, at the year of the program’s inception for cost data, and the year of the relevant survey for our results 
data. We then convert from USD PPP for that year to 2014 USD by multiplying by the ratio of the 2014 US 
Consumer Price Index (CPI) to the US CPI for the year in question. We use the following PPP rates: for Ethiopian 
Birr (ETB) in 2010, 2012, and 2013, 4.18, 6.45 and 6.66, respectively; for Ghanaian Cedis (GHS) in 2011, 2012, 
and 2014, 0.70, 0.79 and 0.91, respectively; for Honduran Lempiras (HNL) in 2009, 2012 and 2013, 9.77, 10.13, 
and 10.15, respectively; for Indian Rupees in 2007, 2009 and 2010, 11.76, 13.20, 14.21, respectively; for Pakistan 
Rupees (PKR) in 2008, 2011, and 2013, 15.84, 24.35,  and 26.83, respectively; for Peruvian Nuevo Soles (PEN) in 
2011, 2013, and 2014, 1.48, 1.53 and 2.03, respectively. The US CPIs used for 2007-2014 are respectively 207.3, 
215.303, 214.537, 218.056, 224.939, 232.957 and 236.9111. 
4 We present bounds for our treatment effects, depending on different assumption with respect to attrition, discussed 
in Results section.  
5 In all countries, individuals were grouped into geographic block strata, which are included here as dummies for 
each block. In Honduras, Peru and Ghana, re-randomization was performed to ensure balance on a set of variables. 
These variables are included as controls. 
6 The ITT estimators can thus be interpreted as effect sizes relative to the control group. 
7 The significance levels reported in Table 3 (* 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%) correspond to the naïve p-values, which can 
be inferred from the coefficient and standard errors. 
8 Mental health questions were not asked in Pakistan in endline 1, while in India, women’s empowerment was not 
asked about in endline 2, and so in both cases the correction is for only 9 outcome families when reporting country-
specific indexed family outcomes in Tables S3a-S3f . However, it is for 10 families in all other cases. 
9 This is gross livestock revenue, not income or net profit. On the expenditure side, it does not include fodder costs 
which was not measured everywhere and was measured with considerable noise even where it was measured. On the 
profit side, it does not include unrealized capital gains (for examples as more calves are born, if they are not sold).  
10 In some sites individuals were shown a ten-rung ladder and asked “How would you describe your satisfaction 
with life? If the top rung of this ladder (10) represents very satisfied and the lowest rung (1) represents very 
dissatisfied, where would you place yourself?” In others, individuals were shown five images of faces, and asked 
“Which picture describes the current satisfaction level with your life, if the smiling face is the most satisfied and the 
crying/frowning face is the least satisfied?” In the latter case, the question was also scaled 1-10. 
11 Bandhan is also probably the organization that has the strongest links to BRAC, and the Bandhan program may 
have been run more similarly to BRAC’s than the others. BRAC staff trained Bandhan staff at the onset of the 
program, for example.   
12 Nor is the consumption increase simply the permanent income hypothesis in operation. If a household were 
capable of smoothing the income shock from the transfer perfectly, the increased long-term consumption would 
simply be the interest rate times the value of the assets transferred. The consumption increases we are observing are 
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Multiple Inference Testing: 
 
Given that multiple families of outcomes are being reported, we correct for the potential issue of 
simultaneous inference using multiple inference testing. We calculate q-values using the Benjamini-
Hochberg step-up method (10) to control the false discovery rate (FDR). The Benjamini-Hochberg 
method finds the adjusted significance levels as follows: 
For each of our m outcome families, let 𝑝1 ≤  𝑝2  ≤  𝑝3 ≤ ⋯  ≤  𝑝𝑚 be the set of ordered p-values that 
correspond to the 𝑚 hypotheses tested. At every significance level α (we initially test α = 0.10, 0.05, 
0.01), let k be the largest value of 𝑖 such that the following condition holds:  
𝑝𝑖  ≤  
𝑖
𝑚
×  𝛼 
 
Then, reject all hypotheses with rank 𝑖 ≤  𝑘. This gives the number of successfully rejected hypotheses 
and the critical p-value α at which every null hypothesis 𝐻𝑖 can be rejected. 
While the Benjamini-Hochberg procedure does measure whether or not a hull hypothesis can be rejected 
at every significance level α tested, it does not provide the smallest level at which the hypothesis is 
rejected. This analog to the p-value (“q-value”) is the minimum significance level α at which the null 
hypothesis can be rejected for all hypotheses whose unadjusted p-values are less than the critical rank, k. 
We follow the procedure outlined in Anderson (11), and test α at all significance levels (1.000, 0.999, 
0.998… 0.000). Our q-value is the smallest α at which the null hypothesis is rejected. The q-value is 




In Table 5, we present quantile regressions of the indexed family outcomes presented in table 3. We test 










 percentiles, of the form: 
𝑌𝑖
𝑘,𝑞 =  𝛼 +  𝛽1𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖 +  𝛽2𝑍𝑖
𝑘 +  𝑻𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒕𝒓𝒚 + 𝜀𝑖 
where 𝑌𝑖
𝑘,𝑞
 is the outcome k of interest at quantile q for either household or adult i, 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖 is an 
indicator for having been randomly selected into the program, 𝑍𝑖
𝑘  is the household or adult’s baseline 
value of the outcome variable k (coded as zero, with an indicator for missing baseline, whenever it was 
not available), and 𝑻𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒕𝒓𝒚 is a vector of dummy variables for each of the countries in the study. Note 
that these specifications differ from the regressions used in Table 3 in that they do not include short 
survey or block stratification controls. We use this simplified regression to ensure convergence for all 
regressions performed. Regressions including the same vector of controls used in Table 3 are qualitatively 
similar to those presented in Table 5 in cases where convergence is achieved.  
Unit of analysis and short survey dummies: 
                                                     
1
 The significance levels reported in Table 3 (* 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%) correspond to the un-adjusted p-values. 
Questions pertaining to consumption, food security, asset ownership, food security, and income and 
revenues were asked at the household level. For each of these variables, our unit of analysis is the 
household. Questions relating to time use, physical and mental health and political and women’s 
empowerment were asked to multiple adults in each household. Each adult is treated as a separate 
observation in these cases, though standard errors were clustered at the household level.
 2
 
In Ghana, Honduras, and Peru, a subset of the sample was asked short surveys during the implementation 
period, between the baseline and endline 1 surveys. These surveys are abbreviated versions of the full-
length surveys, and include sections on topics such as income generating activities, agriculture and 
livestock management, consumption, assets, financial inclusion, and health. Peru had eight rounds of 
short surveys, Honduras had five rounds, and Ghana had three rounds. This analysis includes only short 
survey data from rounds that occurred during the same year as endline 1: four in Peru, two in Honduras, 
and two in Ghana. 
For each of the outcome variables where short survey data exists, our outcome variable at endline 1 is the 
average of endline 1 and all relevant short survey data. We then include country-specific dummy 
variables for each short survey round, equal to 1 if short survey data from that round existed and 0 
otherwise. 
Clustering of standard errors: 
Standard errors are clustered at the level at which randomization took place. In India, Ethiopia, and 
Pakistan, this took place at the household level. Therefore, in pooled analysis, standard errors are not 
clustered for household level results, and are clustered at the household level for adult level outcomes 
(use of time, physical and mental health, political and women’s empowerment).  
However, in Ghana, Honduras and Peru, there were two stages of randomization. In the first stage, 
villages were either selected to be control villages or treatment villages. Then, within treatment villages, 
households were randomly selected to be either treatment or control.  
Among households in treatment villages, whether or not a household was part of the program was decided 
at the individual household level, so each has a cluster of one (and clustered at the household level for 
adult variable outcomes). However, among control villages, their selection as control households was 
determined at the village level, so error terms are likely to be correlated within each village. Therefore, all 
households within each control village share a single cluster. Our standard errors for regressions are 
therefore clustered at the “randomization unit”, with unique clusters for every household in villages where 




Food consumption is valued based on the amount of each type of good that the household consumed. 
The value of each household's consumption is found by multiplying the total amount consumed by the 
household in a given time period (typically, either a week or month) by the unit market price of the good. 
This is true regardless of whether it was a good produced within the home, purchased, or received as a 
                                                     
2
 In most cases, two adults were surveyed per household. However, in households with only one adult, or where only 
one adult could be found, only one adult was surveyed. In India, every adult in the household was surveyed and 
included in analysis (up to as many as 7 adults in a household). 
gift. In cases where market price data is not available, the median price among households who did 
purchase the good is used to determine the unit value, which is then applied to all households. 
 
Nonfood consumption: includes medical expenditures, school fees and expenses, clothing expenses, 
household repairs, temptation goods, fuel expenses, festival expenses, (non-work) transportation 
expenses, and other, country-specific expenses. It does not include any expenses incurred in the running 
of income-generating activities (such as buying inventory, or purchasing feed for livestock). 
 
Income and Revenue: 
 
Agricultural income: Equal to total revenues minus expenses.  
 
Revenues consist of the following components: 
 
Crop production—crop production is valued by multiplying the total amount of each type of crop 
produced (less any given to a landowner through a sharecropping arrangement) by the unit value of each 
crop. In cases where a household sold the crop, the observed sale price is used. In cases where the 
household stored the crop, or consumed it in their home, the total amount of crop production is multiplied 
by the median unit sale price of the crop to estimate the value of production. 
 
Land rents—any income earned from renting out or sharecropping out any land  
 
Expenses include hired labor, fertilizer costs, seed costs, and the cost of renting land. In every case, the 
amount reported by the household is used. The opportunity cost of a household’s own labor is not treated 
as an expense. 
 
Livestock revenue: Revenues consist of the following components: 
 
Revenues from sales—the revenue from animal sales is found by multiplying the number of animals sold 
by the per-animal sale price at the household level.  
 
Slaughters—if an animal is slaughtered, the revenue from this transaction is calculated using the observed 
sale price for the meat. If the sale price of meat is not reported, or the meat was consumed by the 
household, the median sale price of meat is used. 
 
Output production—If a household sells outputs, the observed total sale price is used for the value of 
output production. In cases where the household consumed the products, the total production is multiplied 
by the median per-unit sale price of the output. 
 
Non-farm micro-enterprise: equal to total sales minus total expenses. Expenses include rent, the cost of 
hiring labor, the cost of purchasing inputs, and any other listed expenses in the running of the business. 
Investments in the business (such as purchasing equipment) are not treated as expenses, but rather as a 
credit to the business’ cash account, and a debit to the household’s asset account (and therefore do not 




Weighted asset index: In each of the six countries, households are asked about whether or not they own 
each of several types of durable goods and livestock, and how many of each type they own. In each of the 
six sites, there is also either information on the current value of those livestock, or on the median value of 
purchased livestock.  
 However, the value of durable goods owned is only measured directly in four of the six countries. In 
Ethiopia, households report the current estimated value of the assets they own. In Honduras, Pakistan and 
Peru, households report whether or not they purchased any of the asset in the last year and how much they 
spent, making it possible to estimate the unit value of each durable good. While some assets are unique to 
certain sites (for example, only households in Peru report owning guinea pigs), there are many types of 
assets that are held in several of the sites. (For example, goats, cows, televisions and bicycles are all assets 
that households in every site report owning).  
 
While the cost of each good differs between sites, the relative values of each type of good are strongly 
correlated between sites. (As a robustness check, the correlation between the observed value of assets 
reported in one site and the predicted value of the assets based on relative values from the other sites is 
presented in Table S5a). Therefore, the prices of durable goods in the four countries where data is 
available are used to estimate the relative values of goods in all six sites. All six of the sites report value 
of livestock held, so all six countries’ values for livestock were used in the construction of the relative 
prices. These deduced measures of value are then standardized and reported in a weighted asset index. 
 
The asset index was constructed using the value of goats as the numeraire. Goats were chosen because 
they are an asset held in common across all six sites. The process for creating the index was as follows: 
1. The median unit value for each asset (durable goods and livestock) was calculated in each 
country (for durable goods, only in Pakistan, Honduras, Peru and Ethiopia; for livestock, in all six 
countries). In Ethiopia, the median value is found from all households who own the good and 
offered a valuation of it. In Pakistan, Peru and Honduras the median is calculated from 
households that purchased the good in the past 12 months.  
2. In each site, the value of each asset in terms of goats (the numeraire) was calculated by dividing 
the unit value of each asset by the median unit value of goats. For example, a bicycle in Ethiopia 
is expressed as 1.34 goats. 
3. For every durable good and type of livestock, the medians from each of the countries where price 
information about the good is available are combined to construct a single, cross-site median 
value of each good in terms of goats.  
4. Total asset value, productive asset value, and household asset value in terms of goats is calculated 
for all six sites by multiplying the cross-site unit value of each asset (expressed in terms of goats) 
by the number of each asset owned.  
5. These values are then standardized to the control group within each country and survey round and 
reported as weighted indices. 
 
Activities of Daily Living Score: 
 
This score is one of the components of the physical health index. It measures individuals’ ability to carry 
out a range of physical activities that are common to daily life. Adult respondents are asked to rank their 
ability to do the following physical tasks: (1) Lift a heavy object, (2) Work all day in the field, (3) Walk a 
certain distance without getting tired. These components were scored on a binary (0/1) scale, with 1 
indicating that the respondent was able to complete the activity without help and 0 if they either would 
require help or could not do the activity. These three components were then averaged together to get the 






The stress index is a component of several symptoms of reported mental distress. Respondents were asked 
about how often they (1) feel sad, (2) cry, (3) have no appetite, (4) do not feel like working, and (5) have 
trouble sleeping. In some countries, households report how many times they had these experiences in the 
last week, while in others they report how frequently they experience those emotions on a scale of 1 to 5. 
In both cases, variables are recoded, such that a higher score corresponds to fewer times experiencing the 
negative emotion. Each of the components is then standardized against the control mean from that time 
period, and all of the components are then averaged and standardized to create a single score. 
 
Women’s Decision-making Index: 
 
Only adult women were asked the questions that comprise this index, which measures the women’s role 
in household decisions. Women reported who all in the home was responsible for making decisions 
related to (1) food expenses, (2) education expenses, , (3) health expenses, (4) home improvement 
decisions, and (5) household enterprise management expenses. In cases where multiple people were 
reported having a say, women were asked either who had the “major” say, or who the primary decision-
maker was.  
 
The components were coded on a binary (0/1) scale, with 1 indicating that the woman had the major role 
in the decision-making process, or was the primary person responsible for making that decision, and 0 
otherwise .A higher score on the women’s decision-making index therefore indicates that the respondent 












(1) For consumption and time spent working, the summary outcomes are the aggregate of each of the sub-components, standardized to the control 
mean in each time period. 
(2) For all other families of outcomes, the mean treatment effects correspond to a z-score index of each of the sub-components, averaged and 
standardized against the control mean
SOM Text 2: Components of Indexed Family Outcomes
Formal borrowing, informal borrowing; total amount deposited into savings, total savings balance
Everyone gets enough food every day, no adult skips meal, no one went a whole day without food, no child 
skipped meal, everyone regularly eats two meals a day
Total per capita consumption, disaggregated parts include food consumption, non-food consumption and 
durable good consumption
Revenues from livestock, income from agriculture, income from business, income from paid work, self-
perception of economic status
Total relative value of all assets (productive and household)
Female was primary decision maker in (1) food-related spending decisions, (2) education expenditures, (3) 
health-related expenditures, (4) home improvement decisions, (5) household finances
Index of lack of symptoms of emotional distress, self-perception of life, adult has not experienced 
prolonged period of worry
Activities of daily living scores, adult has not missed work due to illness, self-perception of health
Voted in last election, is a member of a political party, attended village meeting, spoke with village leaders 
about village concerns
Total time spent working, disaggregated parts include time spent on agriculture, livestock, business and 
paid work
Analysis Variables Ethiopia Ghana Honduras
Total consumption per capita, month
Total of all food consumption (detailed below), intoxicants and
fuel * median purchase prices, annual and monthly expenditures,
festival spending, durable good purchases, household repairs,
total medical expenses, total expenses in response to a shock, all
scaled down to monthly values
Total of all food consumption (detailed below), temptation goods
and fuel expenditures, school, clothing, festival expenditures,
transportation, rent, medical expenditures, and home
improvement spending. Scaled to per capita monthly values
Total of all food consumption (detailed below), temptation goods and fuel
expenditures, school, clothing, festival expenditures, transportation, rent,
medical expenditures, durable good purchases, and home improvement
spending. Scaled to per capita monthly values
Food consumption per capita, month
(Quantity*median market price) for each food item in
consumption section. For questions without market data,
median purchase price is used
(Quantity*market price) for each food item in consumption
section; reported in survey as "in last day" or "in last week" so
scaled to monthly per capita; for questions without market data,
median purchase price is used
(Quantity*median market price) for each food item in consumption section;
per capita; reported in survey as "in last day" or "in last week" so scaled to
monthly per capita; for questions without market data, median purchase price 
is used
Nonfood consumption per capita, month
All expenses outlined in monthly average expenditures, less all
spending on food (ie cereals, pulses, dairy, edible oils,
vegetables, fruits and nuts, other foods) and durable good
expenditures
Total monthly expenditures per capita (USD PPP) and total
annual expenditures per capita; not food. Health expenditures,
Education expenditures; home improvement purchases
Total monthly nonfood expenditures per capita and total annual nonfood
expenditures per capita. Health expenditures, Education expenditures. Scaled
to per capita monthly values
Durable good expenditure per capita, month Total of spending on durable goods in last year
Total spending on durable goods last year; scaled to monthly per
capita values
Total value of durable goods bought in last 12 months, in per capita terms,
scaled to per capita monthly
Food security index
Z-score of: everyone gets enough food every day; no adults
skipped meals; no one in household went entire day without
eating; no children skipped meals; and everyone in household
regularly eats two meals per day
Z-score of: everyone in the household gets enough food every
day; no adults ever skipped meals; no adults ever went day
without eating; no children skipped meals
Z-score of: no adults ever skipped meals; no adults ever went day without
eating; no children skipped meals
Everyone in the household gets enough food everyday
Binary (0/1) of whether or not everyone in household gets
enough food every day; imputed by looking at the number of
months that respondent reports not having enough to eat
Binary (0/1) of whether or not everyone in household gets enough
food every day; imputed by looking at the number of months that
respondent reports not having enough to eat
No adults skipped meals
Binary (0/1) of whether or not adults in the household skipped
meals (1 if no adult skipped a meal)
Binary (0/1) of whether or not adults in the household skipped
meals (1 if no adult skipped a meal)
Binary (0/1) of whether or not adults in the household skipped meals (1 if no
adult skipped a meal)
No one in the household went a whole day without food
Binary (0/1) of whether or not anyone in the household went an
entire day without eating; 1 if everyone in the household ate
during a day
Binary (0/1) of whether or not anyone in the household went an
entire day without eating; 1 if everyone in the household ate
during a day
Binary (0/1) of whether or not anyone in the household went an entire day
without eating; 1 if everyone in the household ate during a day
No children skipped meals
Binary (0/1) of whether or not children in the household skipped
meals (1 if no child skipped a meal)
Binary (0/1) of whether or not children in the household skipped
meals (1 if no child skipped a meal)
Binary (0/1) of whether or not children in the household skipped meals (1 if
no child skipped a meal)
Everyone in the household regularly eats two meals per
day
Binary (0/1) of whether or not every member in the household
regularly gets two meals (1 if yes, 0 otherwise)
Asset Index
See SOM Text 1 for detailed description of how index was
constructed. Relative value of durable goods and livestock
based on ownership numbers.
See SOM Text 1 for detailed description of how index was
constructed. Relative value of durable goods and livestock based
on ownership numbers.
See SOM Text 1 for detailed description of how index was constructed.
Relative value of durable goods and livestock based on ownership numbers.
Total asset value
Total value of all durable assets and the value of all livestock
assets owned,  combined 
Value of all durable assets; if purchased use purchase price, if not purchased
use average purchase price per asset) and livestock value
Productive asset index
See SOM Text 1 for detailed description of how index was
constructed. Relative value of productive durable goods and
number of each livestock type based on ownership numbers
See SOM Text 1 for detailed description of how index was
constructed. Relative value of productive durable goods and
number of each livestock type based on ownership numbers
See SOM Text 1 for detailed description of how index was constructed.
Relative value of productive durable goods and number of each livestock
type based on ownership numbers
Productive asset value
Total value of all durable assets the value of all animals and the
value of livestock assets,  combined 
Value of all productive durable assets and livestock using household level
purchase price if available, otherwise median purchase price for that asset in
whole sample
Household asset index
See SOM Text 1 for detailed description of how index was
constructed. Relative value of household durable goods based
on ownership numbers
See SOM Text 1 for detailed description of how index was
constructed. Relative value of household durable goods based on
ownership numbers
See SOM Text 1 for detailed description of how index was constructed.
Relative value of household durable goods based on ownership numbers
Household asset value
Total value of all durable household assets that are not
productive
Value of all household durable assets owned; household level purchase price
used if available, if not the median purchase price in sample
Total amount borrowed, last 12 months
Total of value of all loans taken out in the last year, reported in
loan table
The total amount borrowed in loans over the previous 12 months,
for every household member, aggregated to the household level
Total value of all loans taken out in the last 12 months
Amount borrowed from informal sources, last 12 months
Total value of loans from neighbor, friend, shopkeeper, family
member, work place, moneylender, IQUB
Total value of loans from neighbor, friend, shopkeeper, family
member, work place, moneylender
Total value of loans from neighbor, friend, shopkeeper, family member, work
place, moneylender
Amount borrowed from formal sources, last 12 months Total value of loans from MFI, NGO, Government Total value of loans from MFI, NGO, government Total value of loans from MFI, NGO, Government
Total savings balance Total amount held in savings account Total amount in USD PPP Total amount held in savings account
Amount deposited in savings, month Amount deposited in the last month Amount deposited; asked as in last year, so scaled to monthly
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Total minutes spent on productive activities, last day
Total time spent on PSNP, working on household Land,
working with household livestock, working on household
business, labor outside household in last 48 hours; converted to
min/24h
Aggregate number of minutes spent by each female adult surveyed
on each of the below listed activities: working on household land,
tending household livestock, working in household-owned
business, working outside the household (paid labor); converted
to min/24h
Aggregate number of minutes spent by each adult surveyed on each of the
below listed activities: working on household land, tending household
livestock, working in household-owned business, working outside the
household (paid labor); converted to min/24h
Minutes spent on agriculture in last day  Activities last 48 hours; converted to min/24h
Number of minutes spent by female household members on
agricultural labor in past 7 days; scaled to 24 hours
Number of minutes spent by adult household members on agriculture in past
7 days (scaled to min/24h)
Minutes spent on livestock in last day Activities last 48 hours; converted to min/24h
Number of minutes spent by female household members tending
livestock in past 7 days; scaled to 24 hours
Number of minutes spent by adult household members on livestock in past 7
days (scaled to min/24h)
Minutes spent on own business in last day Activities last 48 hours; converted to min/24h
Number of minutes spent by female household members on micro-
enterprise in past 7 days; scaled to 24 hours
Number of minutes spent by adult household members on own business in
past 7 days (scaled to min/24h)
Minutes spent on paid labor in last day
Activities last 48 hours, including both outside labor and work
on Productive Safety Net Programme; converted to min/24h
Number of minutes spent by female household members on paid
labor in past 7 days; scaled to 24 hours
Number of minutes spent by adult household members on paid work in past
7 days (scaled to min/24h)
Household livestock revenue, month
(1) Total income received from the sale of animals + (2) total
production of all outputs * median sale price of outputs; all
scaled down to monthly values
Gross earnings (USD) from: livestock and products sold (eg.
animals, meat, milk, eggs, skin). Household level sale data is used
when available, otherwise the median sale value of either livestock
or product is used to value revenues. 
Gross earnings from: livestock and products sold (ie. animals, meat, milk,
eggs, skin). Household level sale data is used when available, otherwise the
median sale value of either livestock or product is used to value revenues. 
Household agricultural income, month
(1) Total quantity of crops produced (less any share lost
through sharecropping) * the median sale price of all instances
where the crop was sold + (2) all income earned from renting
out land - (3) all costs of renting - (4) all input costs - (5) seed
costs; all scaled down to monthly values
Use household level sale price to value the income from harvest
when household did sell crops, otherwise use median sale price to
value total production of crop; subtract out expenses (hired labor,
seeds, fertilizer, renting land); scaled to monthly values
Use household level sale price to value the income from harvest when
household did sell crops, otherwise use median sale price to value total
production of crop; subtract out expenses (fertilizer, seeds, renting land,
hired labor); scaled to monthly values
Household non-farm micro-enterprise income, month
(1) Microenterprise average monthly sales + (2) natural product
total production * median sale price - (3) microenterprise
expenses, including rent (per month), input cost, cost of labor,
other expenses
Total profit (sales - expenditures) for a typical month in USD
PPP; total profits are calculated by aggregating over "normal"
months, high-earning months and low-earning months.
Expenditures include rent (per month), input cost, cost of labor,
other expenses.
Total profit (sales - expenditures) for a typical month; total profits are
calculated by aggregating over "normal" months, high-earning months and
low-earning months. Expenditures include rent (per month), input cost, cost
of labor, other expenses.
Household income from paid labor, month
(1) Total of all income from wages outside of household + (2)
quantity of goods earned from food for work program * market
value of goods received
Total earnings from wages outside of the household; scaled to
monthly
Total earnings from wages outside of the household; scaled to monthly.
Self-reported economic status
Self-classification of household's current economic status in
comparison to the rest of the village, using a scale of 1-10
Self-classification of household's current economic status in comparison to
the rest of the village, using a scale of 1-10 using blocks to visualize different
levels of economic status
Physical health index
Z-scores of (1) reported status on health ladder, (2) average
score on activities of daily living score, (3) Number of days
adult missed due to illness; all standardized into single index
Z-score of: missed work days in last month and average of
activities of daily living score
Z-score of: self perception of health; missed work days in last 30 days;
average of Activities of Daily Living scores
Member has not missed any days due to illness, last month
Dummy variable for if adult member is listed in table for having
missed days due to illness/injury
Binary (0/1): member did not miss work or school due to illness
in lasat month
Binary (0/1) Question: Sickness prevented member from going to work or
school
Average activities of Daily Living (ADL) Score
Score of whether or not individual can complete the following
three activities without help: walking 5 km, lifting heavy objects
(10lb), working an entire day without rest; each component is a
Binary (0/1) with 1 if member can complete activitiy without
help and 0 otherwise
Score of whether or not individual can complete the following
three activities without help: walking 5 km, lifting heavy objects
(10lb), working an entire day without rest (each component is
Binary (0/1) 0/1 if individual can complete without help)
Score of whether or not individual can complete the following three activities
without help: walking 5 km, lifting heavy objects (10lb), working an entire
day without rest; each component is a Binary (0/1) with 1 if member can
complete activitiy without help and 0 otherwise
Self perception of physical health
Asks respondent (1-5 scale, least to most satisfied) about
satisfaction with physical health
Asks respondent (1-5 scale, least to most satisfied) about satisfaction with
physical health
Mental health index
Combined z-scores of life satisfaction index, reported distress
index (detailed below), and did not experience period of worry
Combined z-scores of life satisfaction index and report distress
index (detailed below), standardized
Combined z-scores of life satisfaction index and reported distress index
(detailed below), standardized
Self reported happiness
Mental health ladder that asks respondent to rank satisfaction
with mental health on a 1-10 ladder
Asks respondent (1-5 scale, least to most satisfied) about
satisfaction with life
Asks respondent (1-5 scale, least to most satisfied) about satisfaction with
life
Stress Index
Combined z-scores of number of times in the past week did
respondent feel sad, cry a lot, not feel like eating, not feel like
working, have restless sleep; and did respondent have a period
of worry lasting at least 30 days in the last year.
Z-scores of questions regarding frequency of mental distress (1-4
point scale), including feeling sad, crying a lot, not wanting to eat,
not wanting to work, and having restless sleep
Z-scores of questions regarding frequency of mental distress (1-4 point
scale), including feeling sad, crying a lot, not wanting to eat, not wanting to
work, having restless sleep
Member has not experienced period of worry in last year
Dummy for not experiencing more than a month of worry,
tension or axiety in the past year (1 if didn't 0 if did)
Dummy for not experiencing more than a month of worry,
tension, or anxiety in the past year (1 did not, 0 did)
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Index of political involvement
Combined Z-scores of approaching village leaders, participates
in politics
Z-score of did member attend village meetings in the past year
Z-score of: did you vote in the last elections; do you attend village meetings;
do you attend village assemblies
Voted in last election Binary (0/1) for whether or not adult voted in the last election
Member of political party
Binary (0/1) of whether or not adult was a member of a political
party in last year
Binary (0/1) of whether or not adult was a member of a political party in last
year
Attended village meeting in last year
Binary (0/1) of whether or not adult attended a village meeting
in the last year 
Binary (0/1) variable for whether or not adult attended a village
meeting in last year (1=yes, 0=no)
Binary (0/1) variable for whether or not adult attended a village meeting in
last year (1=yes, 0=no)
Has spoken with village members about village concerns
Binary (0/1) of whether or not adult approached village leader
about own or village concerns in last year
Women's decision-making index
Z-score index of women being the primary individual to make
decisions regarding food, clothing, education, health,
business/finance management and home improvement/repair
Z-score index measuring women's decision-making in the
household: woman is primary decision maker (0/1) for food,
education, health, and business management expenses
Z-score index measuring women's decision-making in the household: woman
is primary decision-maker (0/1) for education, health, food, business
management expenses
Food decision-making
How much influence do you have on food expenses within your
household? (1= major influence, 0 = no or minor influence)
How much influence do you have on food expenses within your
household? (1= major influence, 0 = no or minor influence)
How much influence do you have on food expenses within your household?
(1= major influence, 0 = no or minor influence)
Education decision-making
How much influence do you have on education-expenses within
your household? (1= major influence, 0 = no or minor influence)
How much influence do you have on education-expenses within
your household? (1= major influence, 0 = no or minor influence)
How much influence do you have on education-expenses within your
household? (1= major influence, 0 = no or minor influence)
Health decision-making
How much influence do you have on health expenses within
your household? (1= major influence, 0 = no or minor influence)
How much influence do you have on health expenses within your
household? (1= major influence, 0 = no or minor influence)
How much influence do you have on health expenses within your household?
(1= major influence, 0 = no or minor influence)
Home improvement decision-making
How much influence do you have on home improvement/repair
decision within your household? (1= major influence, 0 = no or
minor influence)
Household finances and business decision-making
How much influence do you have on business expenses and
decisions within your household? (1= major influence, 0 = no or
minor influence)
How much influence do you have on household finances within
your household? (1= major influence, 0 = no or minor influence)
How much influence do you have on business expenses and decisions within
your household? (1= major influence, 0 = no or minor influence)
Analysis Variables India Pakistan Peru
Total consumption per capita, month
Total of all food expenditures, tobacco/intoxicants, goods and services in the
last 30 days. Along with goods and services and durables in the last year scaled
to monthly. All divided by number of total household members
Total of food consumption + non-food expenditure + durable goods
expenditure; scaled to per capita monthly values
Total of all food consumption (detailed below), temptation goods and
fuel expenditures, school, clothing, festival expenditures,
transportation, rent, medical expenditures, durable good purchases,
and home improvement spending. Scaled to per capita monthly values
Food consumption per capita, month
Expenditures on food items in the last 30 days and divided by the total number
of household members 
[quantity*value/price, value replaced by median at village level if
missing] for each food item, scaled to monthly per capita values
(Quantity*market price) for each food item in consumption section;
reported in survey as "in last day" or "in last week" so scaled to
monthly per capita; for questions without market data, median
purchase price is used
Nonfood consumption per capita, month
Monthly average expenditure described above less the cost of food in the last
month and divided by the total number of household members
Total non-food expenditures: ceremony, temptation goods, health
expenses,  other goods and services; scaled to monthly per capita values
Total monthly expenditures per capita (USD PPP) and total annual
expenditures per capita (USD); not food. Health expenditures,
Education expenditures. Scaled to per capita monthly values
Durable good expenditure per capita, month
Total of all durable goods purchased in the last year scaled to monthly divided
by total number of household members
Total spending on durable goods last year; scaled to monthly per capita
values
Total value of durable goods bought in last 12 months, scaled to per
capita monthly
Food security index
Z-Score of no adults skipped meals; no one in household went entire day
without eating; no children skipped meals; everyone in household regularly eats
two meals per day
Z-score of: no adults ever skipped meals, no adults ever went day
without eating, no children skipped meals, everyone gets enough food,
everyone eats two meals; standardized
Z score of: no adults ever skipped meals; no adults ever went day
without eating; no children skipped meals; everyone in household gets
enough food every day
Everyone in the household gets enough food everyday
Binary (0/1) of whether or not everyone in household gets enough food
every day; imputed by looking at the number of months that respondent
reports not having enough to eat
No adults skipped meals
Binary (0/1) of whether or not adults in the household skipped meals (1 if no
adult skipped a meal)
Binary (0/1) of whether or not adults in the household skipped meals (1
if no adult skipped a meal)
Binary (0/1) of whether or not adults in the household skipped meals
(1 if no adult skipped a meal)
No one in the household went a whole day without food
Binary (0/1) of whether or not anyone in the household went an entire day
without eating; 1 if everyone in the household ate during a day
Binary (0/1) of whether or not anyone in the household went an entire
day without eating; 1 if everyone in the household ate during a day
Binary (0/1) of whether or not anyone in the household went an entire
day without eating; 1 if everyone in the household ate during a day
No children skipped meals
Binary (0/1) of whether or not children in the household skipped meals (1 if no
child skipped a meal)
Binary (0/1) of whether or not children in the household skipped meals
(1 if no child skipped a meal)
Binary (0/1) of whether or not children in the household skipped meals
(1 if no child skipped a meal)
Everyone in the household regularly eats two meals per
day
Binary (0/1) of whether or not every member in the household regularly gets
two meals (1 if yes, 0 otherwise)
Binary (0/1) of whether or not every member in the household regularly
gets two meals (1 if yes, 0 otherwise)
Asset Index
See SOM Text 1 for detailed description of how index was constructed.
Relative value of durable goods and livestock based on ownership numbers.
See SOM Text 1 for detailed description of how index was constructed.
Relative value of durable goods and livestock based on ownership
numbers.
See SOM Text 1 for detailed description of how index was
constructed. Relative value of durable goods and livestock based on
ownership numbers.
Total asset value
Total value of all durable assets and livestock, using median purchase
price and median livestock value
Value of all durable assets; if purchased use purchase price, if not
purchased use average purchase price per asset) and livestock value
Productive asset index
See SOM Text 1 for detailed description of how index was constructed.
Relative value of productive durable goods and number of each livestock type
based on ownership numbers
See SOM Text 1 for detailed description of how index was constructed.
Relative value of productive durable goods and number of each
livestock type based on ownership numbers
See SOM Text 1 for detailed description of how index was
constructed. Relative value of productive durable goods and number of
each livestock type based on ownership numbers
Productive asset value
Total value of all productive durable assets used for agriculture, animal
husbandry, business and fishing + livestock value [nb*median animal
value]
Value of all productive durable assets and livestock held by household
Household asset index
See SOM Text 1 for detailed description of how index was constructed.
Relative value of household durable goods based on ownership numbers
See SOM Text 1 for detailed description of how index was constructed.
Relative value of household durable goods based on ownership
numbers
See SOM Text 1 for detailed description of how index was
constructed. Relative value of household durable goods based on
ownership numbers
Household asset value Total value of all household durable assets using median purchase price Value in USD PPP of all household durable assets
Total amount borrowed, last 12 months Total value of all household loans taken out in last 12 months Total amount borrowed in loans over the previous 12 months
The total amount borrowed in loans over the previous 12 months, for
every household member, aggregated to the household level
Amount borrowed from informal sources, last 12 months
Total value of loans from family, moneylender, friend, neighbor, shopkeeper or
other.
Total value of loans from family, SHG, moneylender, friend, neighbour,
shop keeper, supplier, cooperative, landlord
Total value of loans from neighbor, friend, shopkeeper, family
member, work place, moneylender
Amount borrowed from formal sources, last 12 months Total value of loans from commercial bank or cooperative/MFI Total value of loans from commercial bank or MFI Total value of loans from MFI, NGO, Government
Total savings balance Total amount in USD PPP
Amount deposited in savings, month How much did the household deposit in savings accounts in the last 30 days Amount deposited into savings in last 30 days Total amount deposited over the last year, scaled to monthly 
Total minutes spent on productive activities, last day Minutes spent in the last 24 hours on the below activities
Total time spent working in agriculture, animal tending, business and
paidwork during last 24 hours; converted to minutes
Aggregate number of minutes spent by each adult surveyed on each of
the below listed activities: working on household land, tending
household livestock, working in household-owned business, working
outside the household (paid labor); converted to min/24h
Minutes spent on agriculture in last day Minutes spent in the last 24 hours tending owned or sharecropped land
Time spent working in agriculture during last 24 hours; converted to
minutes
Number of minutes spent by adult household members on agriculture
in past 7 days (scaled to min/24h)
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Minutes spent on livestock in last day Minutes in the last 24 hours tending owned or leased animals
Time spent working in animal tending during last 24 hours; also
includes time spent fishing; converted to minutes
Number of minutes spent by adult household members on livestock in
past 7 days (scaled to min/24h)
Minutes spent on own business in last day
Minutes in the last 24 hours working at your own business (other than farm or
animals)
Time spent working in own business during last 24 hours; converted to
minutes
Number of minutes spent by adult household members on own
business in past 7 days (scaled to min/24h)
Minutes spent on paid labor in last day
Minutes in the last 24 hours working as an agricultural laborer, doing
housework in another home, other labor and any other work
Time spent working as agricultural laborer, doing housework, working
as non-agricultural laborer and doing other kind of work during last 24
hours; converted to minutes
Number of minutes spent by adult household members on paid work
in past 7 days (scaled to min/24h)
Household livestock revenue, month
Net profit from livestock (Goods consumed /sold+revenue from sales+number
Born*median purchase price)-(Input costs+number of deaths*median purchase
price) Note: no birth/death available in baseline; includes revenues from fishing
Value of animal products sold/consumed [quantity*median price at
village level] + net value livestock sold [nb* (sale price - median
purchase price)] + value livestock born (imputed) [nb*median value] -
expenses - value livestock lost; also includes value of fish caught
[kg*price for sale]; scaled to monthly values; NOT included in this
measure is the total value of livestock purchases (considered an
investment)
Gross earnings (USD) from: livestock and products sold (eg. animals,
meat, milk, eggs, skin). Household level sale data is used when
available, otherwise the median sale value of either livestock or
product is used to value revenues. 
Household agricultural income, month
Net profit from crops. (Amount Consumed or Sold)*Household's average sale
price- Cost of all inputs scaled to monthly
Total value of harvest [quantity produced*median price at village level]
substract out expenses; scaled to monthly values
Use household level sale price to value the income from harvest when
household did sell crops, otherwise use median sale price to value total
production of crop; subtract out expenses (hired labor, seeds, fertilizer,
renting land); scaled to monthly values
Household non-farm micro-enterprise income, month
Net profit from self owned enterprise. Note this is calculated differently by
endline because of different questions. For baseline (Number of goods
sold*price sold at)-(Number of inputs used*input purchase price) For endline:
Total revenue less total costs. For followup money received from sales plus
value of consumption less value of inputs.
Monthly sales - expenses 
Total profit (sales - expenditures) for a typical month in USD; total
profits are calculated by aggregating over "normal" months, high-
earning months and low-earning months. Expenditures include rent
(per month), input cost, cost of labor, other expenses.
Household income from paid labor, month
Self reported income from paid work (Daily labor+formal employment+outside
household "household" type work+tending animals in other household)
Income from wages outside of household (in cash and in kind); scaled
to monthly values; imputed at household level
Total earnings from wages outside of the household; scaled to monthly
Self-reported economic status
Self-classification of household's current economic status in comparison to the
rest of the village, using a scale of 1-10
Self-classification of household's current economic status in comparison
to the rest of the village
Self-classification of household's current economic status in
comparison to the rest of the village, using a scale of 1-10 using blocks
to visualize different levels of economic status
Physical health index
Z-scores of dummy for missing more than 10 consecutive days of work in the
last year, activities of daily living score and self perception of health score
Z-score of: self perception of health and work days lost in last 30 days
because of illness
Z-score of: self perception of health; missed work days in last 30 days;
average of Activities of Daily Living scores
Member has not missed any days due to illness, last month
Dummy for if household member missed more than 10 consecutive days of
work in the last year due to health
Dummy variable for if adult member was unable to work because of
ilness/injury
Binary (0/1) Question: Sickness prevented member from going to
work or school
Average activities of Daily Living (ADL) Score
Average of three questions scaled by 1-Can't do, 2-Can do but only with help, 3-
Difficult but can do with no help, 4-No difficulty. Questions are: Carrying
heavy object (5kg bag), Walk 5km, Work all day in a field
Score of whether or not individual can complete the following three
activities without help: walking 5 km, lifting heavy objects (10lb),
working an entire day without rest (each component is Binary (0/1) 0/1
if individual can complete without help)
Self perception of physical health
Showed respondents a ladder with rungs 1-10 asked where they would place
themselves in terms of satisfaction with their health if 10 is best and 1 is worst
Asks respondent (1-10 scale, least to most satisfied) about satisfaction
with physical health
Asks respondent (1-5 scale, least to most satisfied) about satisfaction
with physical health
Mental health index
Z Scores of the Life Satisfaction Score and the Index of Reported Symptoms of
Mental Distress detailed below
Combined z-scores of life satisfaction index and report distress index,
standardized
Combined z-scores of life satisfaction index and report distress index
(detailed below), standardized
Self reported happiness
Z-Scores of ranking economic satisfaction from 1-10 (1 being the worst),
emotional satisfaction from 1-5 with 1 being the worst
Asks respondent to rank (least to most satisfied) satisfaction with life.
Asks respondent (1-5 scale, least to most satisfied) about satisfaction
with life
Stress Index
Z-Scores of how frequently they have been feeling sad, crying a lot, not wanting
to do work and having restless sleep reported from 3-Not at All to 0-All of the
time
Z-scores of questions regarding frequency of mental distress [0 to 4]
including feeling sad, crying a lot, not wanting to eat, not wanting to
work, having restless sleep; standardized
Z-scores of questions regarding frequency of mental distress (1-4 point
scale), including feeling sad, crying a lot, not wanting to eat, not
wanting to work, having restless sleep
Member has not experienced period of worry in last year
Dummy for not experiencing more than a month of worry, tension or axiety in
the past year (1 if didn't 0 if did)
Index of political involvement
Z-scores of voting in the last local election and number of times contacted
village leaders.
Z-scores of: did you attend village meetings, are you member of village
committee, did you ever approach village elder
Z-score of: did you vote in the last elections; are you member of
political party; do you attend village meetings
Voted in last election Binary (0/1) for whether or not adult voted in the last election Binary (0/1) for whether or not adult voted in the last election
Member of political party Binary (0/1) for whether or not adult is member of political party
Attended village meeting in last year
Binary (0/1) variable for whether or not adult regularly attended a
village meeting in last year (1=yes, 0=no)
Has spoken with village members about village concerns
Binary (0/1) of whether or not adult approached village leader about own or
village concerns in last year; taken from question regarding the number of times
a member approached a village leader in the last year
Analysis Variables India Pakistan Peru
SOM Text 3: Cross-Site Variable Construction Descriptions
Women's decision-making index
Z-scores of a woman being the primary decision-maker in how much to spend
on food, education, health, home improvement/repair and land sale/purchase
Z-score index measuring women's decision-making in the household for
food, clothing, education, health, home improvement and land purchase
Z-score index measuring women's decision-making in the household:
woman is primary decision-maker (0/1) for education, health, food,
business management expenses
Food decision-making
How much influence do you have on food expenses within your household? (1=
major influence, 0 = no or minor influence)
How much influence do you have on food expenses within your
household? (1= major influence, 0 = no or minor influence)
How much influence do you have on food expenses within your
household? (1= major influence, 0 = no or minor influence)
Education decision-making
How much influence do you have on education-expenses within your
household? (1= major influence, 0 = no or minor influence)
How much influence do you have on education-expenses within your
household? (1= major influence, 0 = no or minor influence)
How much influence do you have on education-expenses within your
household? (1= major influence, 0 = no or minor influence)
Health decision-making
How much influence do you have on health expenses within your household?
(1= major influence, 0 = no or minor influence)
How much influence do you have on health expenses within your
household? (1= major influence, 0 = no or minor influence)
How much influence do you have on health expenses within your
household? (1= major influence, 0 = no or minor influence)
Home improvement decision-making
How much influence do you have on home improvement/repair decision within
your household? (1= major influence, 0 = no or minor influence)
How much influence do you have on home improvement decisions
within your household? 1=major influence; 0= minor or no influence
How much influence do you have on home improvement expenses
within your household? (1= major influence, 0 = no or minor
influence)
Household finances and business decision-making
How much influence do you have on business expenses such as land sale
purchase and decisions within your household? (1= major influence, 0 = no or
minor influence)
How much influence do you have on business expenses and decisions
within your household? (1= major influence, 0 = no or minor
influence)
SOM Text 4: Spillover Analysis  
All of the sites include randomly selected control households in treatment villages, and three of the sites 
only include such households. A possible concern is that any spillover effects of the program on control 
households will bias the estimated impact, either upwards or downwards. To assess the magnitude of such 
possible bias, three of the sites included a cross-village randomization as well as a within-village 
randomization. Tables S6a and S6b examine evidence of spillovers in endlines 1 and 2. The first two 
columns show the results of the specification used in the main section of the paper, restricted to these 
three countries. Columns (3) and (4) compare the treatment households to control households in control 
communities (thus avoiding comparison with any household that was subject to spillover).  Columns (5) 
and (6) report the difference and associated q-values between control households and treatment 
households within treatment communities. Columns (7) and (8) report the comparison between the 
spillover households (control households in treatment communities) and the households in control 
communities. Focusing on column (7) first, the evidence for spillovers is not strong. Only two of the 
differences between spillover and pure control households are significant at the 10% level when using 
naïve p-values (all negative: income and revenue, mental health, and physical health), and none even at 
the 10% when using q-values at endline 1. At endline 2, three outcomes are significant at the 10% level 
when using naïve p-values (mental health, physical health, and women’s empowerment), and only mental 
health remains significant at the 10% level when using q-values. Comparing column (3) to column (1), we 
can get a sense of how only using the pure control households would modify the conclusions in Ghana, 
Honduras and Peru. We would get a larger and more significant point estimate for consumption at endline 
1, though would not have a significant point estimate at endline 2 for these three countries. The impact on 
food security would be weaker in both time periods, as would the impact on time working and physical 
health at endline 1. Other estimates stay similar, occasionally with higher q-values.  
Before adjusting for multiple hypothesis testing, we find significant negative point estimates for 
spillovers on income and revenues (in endline 1, but not endline 2), physical health (both endlines), 
mental health (endline 2, but not endline 1) and women’s empowerment (endline 2, but not endline 1). 
Three of these outcomes, physical health, mental health and women’s empowerment, include self-
reported subjective measures and may have been negatively affected by seeing some similar household 
(or woman) receive benefits they did not get. However, none of these comparisons is statistically 
significant at 95% after adjusting for multiple hypotheses testing. 
 
SOM Text 5: Cost-Benefit Analysis Calculations 
Administrative Data for Costs 
 
Costs were provided by each of the implementing partners, following a template provided by 
researchers on the project. The organizations provided details of the total program costs and each 
line item, and the total number of participants in the program. Costs were then converted to a 
per-person basis. 
 
All costs are assumed to exist at year 0 (rather than spread-out through the duration of the 
program), and are inflated to year-three net present value, with the equation: 
 
𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑎𝑡 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 3 = 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡=0 ∗ (1.05)
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For our measurement of benefits, we include observed non-durable consumption, accumulated 
household assets, and estimated future consumption (including the purchase of durable goods). 
For years 1-3 of the program, we do not include durable good expenditures in our calculations, 
since any accumulated assets as a result of the program will be measured in our Household Asset 
ITT Treatment Effect. We do not include productive assets or savings in our measure of change 
in wealth, on the grounds that both of these asset types are likely to be used to finance future 
consumption.  
 
For our estimates of future consumption, we use total consumption (i.e. including durable good 
expenditures) since this measure will incorporate any long-term changes in household asset 
wealth. We employ a Permanent Income Hypothesis, and thus assume that the consumption 
gains observed at year 3 exist in perpetuity.  
 
We assume an annual discount rate of 5% for all calculations, and in the sensitivity section of 




Year Two Annual Non-durable Consumption ITT Treatment Effect: We use the per capita ITT 
estimates for per capita non-durable consumption at endline 1 (i.e. two years into the program). 
We convert these estimates to Year Three values with the equation: 
 
𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑇𝑤𝑜 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐵𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡 = 𝐸𝑛𝑑𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒 1 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐼𝑇𝑇 ∗ (1.05) 
 
Year One Annual Non-durable Consumption ITT Treatment Effect: We assume the ITT 
estimates observed at endline 1 also took place at endline 1. 
 Year Three Annual Non-durable Consumption ITT Treatment Effect: Here, we use the endline 
2 data (i.e. three years after the introduction of the program), and multiply by the household size 
and by 12 to annualize values. Given that our time period of interest is year 3, we do not adjust 
these values to calculate net present value. 
 
Household Asset Value ITT Treatment Effect: In four of the six sites, we use the ITT treatment 
effects reported in Column (6) of Table S5C-2, the endline 2 values of household assets. 
However, we do not ask directly about the value of assets in either Ghana or India. Instead, we 
rely on Column (5) of the same table, the household asset index.  
 
To construct all of our asset indices, we rely on relative prices where available, and value asset 
ownership based on the relative value of all goods. Therefore, we can use the price data we have 
available in each site to estimate what an effect size is “worth” in terms of USD. We employ the 
following equation, using our data on asset weights in the index, 𝛾, and asset prices, 𝛼. 
 








Future Consumption ITT Treatment Effect: We assume that the total consumption treatment 
effect observed at endline 2 (i.e. year 3) continues in perpetuity. We first calculate total 
consumption by multiplying per capita total monthly consumption by the household size and 
annualizing the values. We then discount this consumption to reflect the fact our “future 




𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑓𝑢𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑖𝑛 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 =





We then calculate the net present value of the benefits as the sum of (a) the one-year non-durable 
consumption increases, (b) the two-year non-durable consumption increases, (c) the three-year 
non-durable consumption increases, (d) the three-year household asset value increase, and (e) the 




Ratio: The benefit/cost ratio is calculated as the net present value of the benefits over the net 
present value of the costs, presented as our main measure of cost-benefit. As a robustness check, 
we also measure how the benefit/cost ratio changes when we instead apply discount rates of 7% 
and 10%. 
Dissipation rate: as a further robustness check, we examine how the benefit/cost ratio changes if 
the treatment effect on consumption dissipates over time. We find the dissipation rate δ that 
lowers benefits sufficiently such that they equal costs. Specifically, we find the δ that satisfies 
the following equation: 
 








𝐶 = 𝐵 +  
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑚.𝑒𝑙2∗ (1 − 𝛿)
1.05
. 05 + 𝛿
 
 
The solution for δ can then be found with the following algebraic steps: 
(.05 +  𝛿)(𝐶 − 𝐵) =




(. 05 + 𝛿)(𝐶 − 𝐵)(1.05) = 1(𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑚.𝑒𝑙2 ) − 𝛿(𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑝.𝑒𝑙2 ) 
 
(0.05)(𝐶 − 𝐵)(1.05) +  𝛿(𝐶 − 𝐵)(1.05) + 𝛿(𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑝.𝑒𝑙2 ) = 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑝.𝑒𝑙2 
 
𝛿((1.05)(𝐶 − 𝐵) ∓ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑝.𝑒𝑙2 ) = 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑝.𝑒𝑙2− (.05)(𝐶 − 𝐵)(1.05) 
 
𝛿 =
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑝.𝑒𝑙2− (.07)(𝐶 − 𝐵)(1.07)
(1.07)(𝐶 − 𝐵) + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑝.𝑒𝑙2
 
 
We report the 𝛿 that satisfies this equation for each country in Table 4. 
 
Table S1a. Baseline Summary Statistics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Pooled Ethiopia Ghana Honduras India Pakistan Peru
Panel A. Consumption including health and durable goods spending
Total per capita consumption, mean 69.13 47.49 53.97 46.27 39.88 132.55 99.46
(0.68) (1.40) (0.77) (0.62) (0.76) (3.88) (1.23)
Total per capita consumption, median 57.36 36.60 43.35 39.67 34.37 97.21 87.69
Total daily per capita consumption, median 1.912 1.220 1.445 1.322 1.146 3.240 2.923
Share of households below $1.25/day 0.43 0.66 0.53 0.60 0.73 0.12 0.10
Panel B. Consumption not including health and durable goods spending
Total per capita consumption, mean 60.36 44.90 53.46 35.47 32.13 103.79 90.11
(0.94) (1.42) (0.77) (0.88) (0.55) (6.61) (1.12)
Total per capita consumption, median 52.36 34.94 43.00 34.76 28.86 83.14 81.28
Total daily per capita consumption, median 1.745 1.165 1.433 1.159 0.962 2.771 2.709
Share of households below $1.25/day 0.48 0.69 0.54 0.69 0.84 0.18 0.14
Panel C. World Bank Poverty Lines
World Bank share in country below $1.25/day line 0.19 0.37 0.29 0.17 0.24 0.13 0.03
Year of World Bank poverty data N/A 2011 2006 2011 2011 2011 2012
Notes:
1. All monetary values are reported in 2014 USD, Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) terms.
2. The consumption aggregate used in our data differs from the format recommended by Angus Deaton and Salman Zaidi's World Bank document, "Guidelines for Construction Consumption 
Aggregates for Welfare Analysis", which is commonly used for Living Standard Measurement Studies. In particular, we include medical expenditures and durable good purchases. Therefore, in 
Panel B we offer a consumption measure that excludes these measures to offer a figure comparable to World Bank Data.
3. The national poverty lines listed for the pooled sample are weighted by observation rather than by country. For each country, we therefore multiple the incidence of poverty in that country by 
































Panel A: T-test comparing means of 
baseline characteristics, by treatment 
status
Control Mean (standard error) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.0124) (0.0124) (0.0124) (0.0124) (0.0110) (0.0124) (0.0098) (0.0112) (0.0102) (0.0123)
Treatment Mean (standard error) -0.0323 -0.0033 0.0277 -0.0320 -0.0291 0.0188 0.0105 0.0298 -0.0249 -0.0314
(0.0140) (0.0165) (0.0188) (0.0169) (0.0132) (0.0190) (0.0128) (0.0149) (0.0124) (0.0151)
P-value from t-test of equality of means 0.0979 0.8735 0.2019 0.1217 0.0904 0.3887 0.5130 0.1092 0.1226 0.1077
Panel B: OLS regression, with controls for 
site
Treatment -0.0310 0.005 0.0180 -0.027 -0.026 0.015 0.008 0.03 -0.022 -0.03
(0.020) (0.021) (0.022) (0.021) (0.018) (0.022) (0.016) (0.019) (0.016) (0.020)
Observations 10213 10310 10318 10334 13983 10344 16991 12559 15992 10922
R-Squared 0.0000 0.0000 0.0010 0.0010 0.0000 0.0010 0.0010 0.0000 0.0000 0.0010
Panel C: Regression of Treatment on all 
family outcome index variables
F-test from regression of treatment on all 10 
outcome variables listed above 0.738
p-value 0.689
Table S1c: Orthogonality by Country, Comparison of Means
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Ethiopia
Control Mean (standard error) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.0463) (0.0463) (0.0463) (0.0463) (0.0391) (0.0463) (0.0391) (0.0391) (0.0391) (0.0507)
Treatment Mean (standard error) -0.0774 0.0193 0.1694 -0.0968 -0.0661 0.0675 -0.0747 0.0098 0.0130 -0.0980
(0.0315) (0.0466) (0.0663) (0.0350) (0.0392) (0.0475) (0.0407) (0.0379) (0.0389) (0.0498)
p-value from t-test of equality of means 0.1689 0.7688 0.0359 0.0966 0.2325 0.3092 0.1858 0.8573 0.8136 0.1681
Ghana
Control Mean (standard error) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.0227) (0.0227) (0.0227) (0.0227) (0.0227) (0.0228) (0.0229) (0.0227)
Treatment Mean (standard error) -0.0368 0.0957 -0.0131 -0.0247 0.0044 0.0488 0.0005 0.0218
(0.0357) (0.0430) (0.0254) (0.0255) (0.0510) (0.0394) (0.0390) (0.0395)
p-value from t-test of equality of means 0.4044 0.0387 0.7518 0.5537 0.9289 0.2810 0.9914 0.6293
Honduras
Control Mean (standard error) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.0250) (0.0250) (0.0250) (0.0250) (0.0176) (0.0250) (0.0175) (0.0196) (0.0196) (0.0258)
Treatment Mean (standard error) 0.0226 -0.0199 -0.0281 0.0929 -0.0291 -0.0107 -0.0087 0.0509 -0.0085 0.0223
(0.0346) (0.0356) (0.0181) (0.0666) (0.0251) (0.0315) (0.0267) (0.0286) (0.0285) (0.0371)
p-value from t-test of equality of means 0.6010 0.6488 0.4608 0.1132 0.3461 0.8003 0.7816 0.1402 0.8041 0.6217
India (Bandhan)
Control Mean (standard error) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.0463) (0.0463) (0.0463) (0.0463) (0.0352) (0.0463) (0.0331) (0.0352) (0.0331) (0.0331)
Treatment Mean (standard error) -0.0109 -0.0575 0.0748 -0.0277 -0.0037 0.1344 0.1138 0.0550 -0.0683 -0.0631
(0.0354) (0.0444) (0.0514) (0.0315) (0.0337) (0.0853) (0.0355) (0.0354) (0.0318) (0.0297)
p-value from t-test of equality of means 0.8506 0.3702 0.2830 0.6162 0.9399 0.1781 0.0202 0.2725 0.1374 0.1552
Pakistan
Control Mean (standard error) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.0404) (0.0397) (0.0396) (0.0397) (0.0258) (0.0396) (0.0254) (0.0254) (0.0359)
Treatment Mean (standard error) -0.0345 -0.0852 0.0651 -0.0844 -0.0740 -0.0415 0.0132 -0.0428 -0.0257
(0.0319) (0.0385) (0.0735) (0.0221) (0.0237) (0.0341) (0.0244) (0.0246) (0.0352)
p-value from t-test of equality of means 0.5015 0.1235 0.4401 0.0609 0.0343 0.4256 0.7078 0.2261 0.6099
Peru
Control Mean (standard error) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.0271) (0.0267) (0.0267) (0.0266) (0.0224) (0.0266) (0.0223) (0.0224) (0.0224) (0.0298)
Treatment Mean (standard error) -0.0720 0.0215 -0.0311 -0.0853 0.0351 0.0062 -0.0351 0.0072 -0.0142 -0.0627
(0.0328) (0.0371) (0.0358) (0.0279) (0.0333) (0.0338) (0.0307) (0.0300) (0.0277) (0.0380)




























Table S1d: Orthogonality by Country, Baseline Characteristics on Treatment




























Ethiopia -0.077 0.02 0.17** -0.097* -0.0660 0.067 -0.075 0.0098 0.013 -0.098
(0.056) (0.066) (0.081) (0.058) (0.055) (0.066) (0.056) (0.054) (0.055) (0.071)
Observations 925 925 925 925 1317 925 1317 1316 1317 783
R-Squared 0.002 0.000 0.005 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.002
Ghana -0.0370 0.096** -0.0130 -0.0250 0.0490 0.0044 0.0120 0.0005 0.0220
(0.0440) (0.0460) (0.0420) (0.0420) (0.0450) (0.0490) (0.0450) (0.0450) (0.0450)
Observations 2602 2604 2606 2601 2579 2605 2560 2572 2617
R-Squared 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Honduras 0.0230 -0.0200 -0.0280 0.0930 -0.0290 -0.0110 -0.0087 0.0510 -0.0085 0.0220
(0.0430) (0.0440) (0.0380) (0.0590) (0.0310) (0.0420) (0.0310) (0.0350) (0.0340) (0.0450)
Observations 2376 2376 2376 2375 4746 2376 4836 3850 3867 2224
R-Squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000
India -0.0110 -0.0580 0.0750 -0.0280 -0.0037 0.1300 0.11** 0.0550 -0.0680 -0.0630
(0.0580) (0.0640) (0.0700) (0.0550) (0.0490) (0.1000) (0.0490) (0.0500) (0.0460) (0.0440)
Observations 978 978 978 978 1729 978 1950 1729 1950 1950
R-Squared 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.001
Pakistan -0.0340 -0.0850 0.0650 -0.084* -0.074** -0.0420 0.0130 -0.0430 -0.0260
(0.0510) (0.0550) (0.0840) (0.0450) (0.0350) (0.0520) (0.0350) (0.0350) (0.0500)
Observations 1250 1289 1295 1294 3078 1299 3189 3189 1594
R-Squared 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.003 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Peru -0.0720 0.0210 -0.0310 -0.085** 0.0350 0.0062 -0.0350 0.0072 -0.0140 -0.0630
(0.0440) (0.0460) (0.0450) (0.0420) (0.0390) (0.0440) (0.0380) (0.0370) (0.0360) (0.0490)
Observations 2082 2138 2138 2161 3113 2161 3120 3104 3097 1754
R-Squared 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001
Table S1e: Orthogonality by Country, Joint Test of Significance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ethiopia Ghana Honduras India Pakistan Peru
Joint F-test of treatment on all family outcome variables 1.128 0.846 0.838 1.914 1.039 1.173
p-value 0.338 0.573 0.591 0.0398 0.406 0.304
Table S1f: Pooled Attrition
Dependent Variable: Completed Survey, OLS
Endline 1 Endline 2
Panel A.




Surveyed mean 0.940 0.91
Panel B.
Treatment Status 0.0073 0.009
(0.0054) (0.0060)
Consumption per capita, standardized 0.00 0.00
(0.003) (0.003)
Food Security Index 0.000 -0.001
(0.003) (0.003)
Asset index 0.0068*** 0.0080***
(0.0023) (0.0025)
Financial Inclusion Index -0.00087 -0.00160
(0.0023) (0.0026)
Time spent working, standardized 0.0009 -0.0010
(0.0035) (0.0039)
Incomes and Revenues Index 0.00 0.0053**
(0.002) (0.003)
Physical Health Index 0.0024 0.004
(0.003) (0.003)
Mental Health Index 0.00 -0.0065**
(0.0028) (0.0032)
Political Involvement Index 0.001 0.0075**
(0.003) (0.003)




Attrition mean 0.940 0.910
Panel C.
Treatment Status 0.0087 0.0091
(0.0069) (0.0078)
Baseline characteristics Yes Yes
Baseline characteristics interacted with Treatment Yes Yes
N 10499 10487
R-Squared 0.17 0.21
Attrition mean 0.94 0.91
p-value from test that Treatment and all other variables above interacted with 
Treatment are jointly 0
0.75 0.17
Table S1g: Attrition by Country, Endline 1
Dependent Variable: Completed Survey, OLS
Ethiopia Ghana Honduras India Pakistan Peru
Panel A.
Treatment Status -0.00027 0.00071 0.019* 0.00093 0.021 0.001
(0.0068) (0.0052) (0.011) (0.022) (0.020) (0.014)
N 925 2606 2403 983 1299 2283
R-Squared 0.006 0.0340 0.023 0.30 0.12 0.035
Surveyed mean 0.99 0.99 0.95 0.83 0.83 0.92
Panel B.
Treatment Status -0.00110 0.00150 0.019* -0.0031 0.019 -0.0016
(0.0061) (0.0052) (0.011) (0.022) (0.020) (0.013)
Consumption per capita, standardized -0.0041 -0.00120 0.0042 0.022 -0.0019 0.00
(0.0037) (0.00200) (0.0047) (0.014) (0.012) (0.0064)
Food Security Index 0.0039 -0.0014 -0.0004 -0.022* 0.0000 0.01
(0.0033) (0.00200) (0.0046) (0.013) (0.011) (0.0060)
Asset index -0.00063 0.00230 0.0050 -0.00031 -0.0015 0.033***
(0.0027) (0.0020) (0.0051) (0.011) (0.0068) (0.0064)
Financial Inclusion Index 0.0029 0.00 0.0050 -0.01 -0.023* -0.01
(0.0035) (0.00200) (0.0034) (0.013) (0.013) (0.0063)
Time spent working, standardized 0.0000 0.00000 0.0086 0.017 0.01 -0.011*
(0.0035) 0.00000 (0.0071) (0.015) (0.015) (0.0062)
Incomes and Revenues Index -0.00082 0.000690 -0.0029 -0.003 -0.002 -0.005
(0.0032) (0.00180) (0.0047) (0.007) (0.011) (0.0065)
Physical Health Index -0.0002 0.0010 0.0085 0.031** -0.00044 -0.0054
(0.0038) (0.00190) (0.0063) (0.015) (0.014) (0.0070)
Mental Health Index -0.00087 -0.00150 -0.0027 0.015 0.00000 -0.016**
(0.0039) (0.00200) (0.0051) (0.015) 0.000000 (0.0070)
Political Involvement Index 0.00001 0.0028000 0.00370 0.013 0.0078 -0.00380
(0.0038) (0.00190) (0.0055) (0.016) (0.016) (0.0064)
Women's Empowerment Index 0.00097 -0.00260 -0.0043 0.0010 -0.0093 -0.0067
(0.0036) (0.0020) (0.0047) (0.015) (0.012) (0.0066)
N 925 2606 2403 983 1299 2283
R-Squared 0.23 0.06 0.03 0.31 0.14 0.06
Surveyed mean 0.99 0.99 0.95 0.83 0.83 0.92
Panel C.
Treatment Status -0.00120 -0.00074 0.01700 -0.0010 0.0110 0.0090
(0.0068) (0.005) (0.011) (0.022) (0.022) (0.015)
Baseline characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Baseline characteristics interacted with Treatment Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 925 2606 2403 983 1299 2283
R-Squared 0.23 0.09 0.04 0.32 0.16 0.07
Surveyed mean 0.99 0.99 0.95 0.83 0.83 0.92
p-value from test that Treatment and all other variables above interacted with 
Treatment are jointly 0
0.97 0.99 0.38 0.45 0.54 0.59
Table S1h: Attrition by Country, Endline 2
Dependent Variable: Completed Survey, OLS
Ethiopia Ghana Honduras India Pakistan Peru
Panel A.
Treatment Status 0.0059 0.0051 0.0180 0.0210 0.0140 -0.0037
(0.0088) (0.0130) (0.0130) (0.0180) (0.0180) (0.0160)
N 925 2606 2401 984 1299 2272
R-Squared 0.025 0.138 0.022 0.316 0.421 0.028
Surveyed mean 0.98 0.94 0.93 0.89 0.79 0.90
Panel B.
Treatment Status 0.00500 0.00560 0.02100 0.01700 0.01000 -0.00520
(0.0082) (0.0130) (0.0130) (0.0180) (0.0180) (0.0160)
Consumption per capita, standardized -0.0017 -0.0046 -0.0033 0.0150 0.0170 -0.0031
(0.0050) (0.0049) (0.0056) (0.0110) (0.0110) (0.0074)
Food Security Index 0.0049 -0.0066 0.0057 -0.0053 -0.0067 0.0018
(0.0045) (0.0048) (0.0055) (0.0100) (0.0100) (0.0069)
Asset index 0.00140 -0.00210 0.00790 0.00550 0.00770 0.025***
(0.0036) (0.0050) (0.0061) (0.0089) (0.0060) (0.0075)
Financial Inclusion Index 0.0039 -0.012** 0.0015 0.0028 -0.0026 -0.0020
(0.0048) (0.0050) (0.0040) (0.0110) (0.0110) (0.0073)
Time spent working, standardized -0.0030 0.0000 0.017** 0.0069 -0.0021 -0.014*
(0.0048) 0.0000 (0.0085) (0.0120) (0.0140) (0.0072)
Incomes and Revenues Index 0.00003 0.0074* 0.00300 0.00170 0.01100 0.00860
(0.0043) (0.0044) (0.0057) (0.0060) (0.0098) (0.0076)
Physical Health Index -0.0003 0.0038 0.013* 0.025** 0.0005 -0.0012
(0.0051) (0.0048) (0.0075) (0.0130) (0.0120) (0.0081)
Mental Health Index 0.00450 -0.00380 0.00510 -0.00760 0.00000 -0.026***
(0.0052) (0.0049) (0.0060) (0.0120) 0.0000 (0.0081)
Political Involvement Index 0.00120 0.013*** 0.015** 0.00760 0.02000 -0.00430
(0.0051) (0.0048) (0.0066) (0.0130) (0.0140) (0.0074)
Women's Empowerment Index 0.00003 -0.00700 -0.018*** 0.00990 -0.022** 0.00480
(0.0048) (0.0049) (0.0056) (0.0120) (0.0110) (0.0077)
N 925 2606 2401 984 1299 2272
R-Squared 0.17 0.15 0.04 0.32 0.44 0.05
Surveyed mean 0.98 0.94 0.93 0.89 0.79 0.90
Panel C.
Treatment Status 0.0046 0.0078 0.0220 0.0180 0.0055 -0.0065
(0.0092) (0.0130) (0.0130) (0.0180) (0.0190) (0.0170)
Baseline characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Baseline characteristics interacted with Treatment Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 925 2606 2401 984 1299 2272
R-Squared 0.18 0.16 0.04 0.33 0.45 0.06
Surveyed mean 0.98 0.94 0.93 0.89 0.79 0.90
p-value from test that Treatment and all other variables above interacted with 
Treatment are jointly 0
0.97 0.58 0.88 0.76 0.85 0.35
Table S2a: Per Capita Consumption














Treatment (ITT): Endline 1 4.55*** 3.87*** 0.61 -0.029
(1.22) (0.84) (0.74) (0.16)
Observations 9,688 9,687 9,684 9,688
R-squared 0.46 0.46 0.21 0.108
Control mean 78.8 51.6 25.3 1.92
F-test: equality of ITT coefficients across sites 1.70 0.88 3.69 1.04










Treatment (ITT): Endline 2 3.36*** 2.62*** 0.83 -0.11
(1.18) (0.69) (0.76) (0.23)
Observations 9,495 9,493 9,503 9,494
R-squared 0.38 0.41 0.20 0.080
Control mean 68.8 41.2 25.0 2.13
F-test: equality of ITT coefficients across sites 2.79 1.64 3.04 3.48











1. Results presented are intent-to-treat estimates, including country Dummy variables, controls for the household's value at baseline and 
controls for every variable used in block stratification and in re-randomization procedures
2. Dummy variables are included for Endline 1 regressions of whether the data used includes each wave of short survey data
3. All values reported in 2014 USD, Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) terms
4.  Column (1) is the sum of columns (2) through (4). 
Table S2b: Food Security
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)






No one in the 
household went 




Everyone in the 
household 
regularly eats 
two meals per 
day
Treatment (ITT): Endline 1 0.035** 0.042*** 0.032*** 0.027*** 0.023**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Observations 4477 9606 9604 9467 2792
R-squared 0.35 0.29 0.21 0.28 0.12
Control mean 0.42 0.51 0.83 0.73 0.90
F-test: equality of ITT coefficients across sites 2.03 1.16 5.07 0.60 1.78












Treatment (ITT): Endline 2 0.056*** 0.043*** 0.020** 0.036*** 0.024**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Observations 5243 9484 9482 9285 2804
R-squared 0.28 0.25 0.19 0.29 0.09
Control mean 0.40 0.48 0.84 0.72 0.92
F-test: equality of ITT coefficients across sites 6.22 2.39 1.18 0.79 2.65













1. Results presented are intent-to-treat estimates, including country Dummy variables,controls for the household's value at baseline and controls for every 
variable used in both block stratification and in re-randomization procedures
Table S2c: Asset Ownership












Treatment (ITT): Endline 1 0.26*** 340*** 0.27*** 296*** 0.038* 6.030
(0.023) (50.1) (0.024) (43.8) (0.021) (11.5)
Observations 9720 5238 9720 5238 9684 5226
R-squared 0.251 0.564 0.227 0.593 0.316 0.366
Control mean 0.000 2620 0.000 1964 0.000 630
F-test: equality of ITT coefficients across sites 14.3 34.3 14.0 34.5 1.16 3.32














Treatment (ITT): Endline 2 0.25*** 281*** 0.25*** 215*** 0.083*** 15.8
(0.024) (47.5) (0.025) (36.3) (0.022) (14.00)
Observations 9508 6181 9508 6191 9488 6170
R-squared 0.23 0.44 0.22 0.46 0.26 0.40
Control mean 0.000 2300 0.000 1576 0.000 634
F-test: equality of ITT coefficients across sites 23.9 25.8 21.0 25.1 5.12 4.68















1. Results presented are intent-to-treat estimates, including country Dummy variables, controls for the household's value at baseline and controls for every variable used in both block 
stratification and in re-randomization procedures
2. Columns (2), (4) and (6) are reported in 2014 USD, Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) terms.
3. Columns (1), (3) and (5) report indices that weight assets based on their relative values, and are standardized to each country’s control group mean in every time period. See SOM 
Text 1 for details of the calculations used to construct the asset indices.
Table S2d: Financial Inclusion


















Treatment (ITT): Endline 1 3.72 -0.4 3.81 151*** 7.25***
(15.4) (18.1) (4.66) (12.1) (1.3)
Observations 9707 7158 7158 7815 7115
R-squared 0.14 0.114 0.054 0.15 0.09
Control mean 181 218 28.1 97.1 12.5
F-test: equality of ITT coefficients across sites 1.30 0.65 1.60 134 20.6












Treatment (ITT): Endline 2 -12.90 -41.3* 22.7*** 75.0*** 3.64*
(20.7) (24.4) (5.72) (11.5) (2.06)
Observations 9475 7037 7038 7581 7040
R-squared 0.15 0.12 0.10 0.099 0.097
Control mean 254 323 30.6 78.4 21.1
F-test: equality of ITT coefficients across sites 3.68 2.47 8.8 20.4 1.25













1. Results presented are intent-to-treat estimates, including country Dummy variables, controls for the household's value at baseline and controls for every 
variable used in both block stratification and in re-randomization procedures
2. Dummy variables are included for Endline 1 regressions of whether the data used includes each wave of short survey data
3. All values are reported in 2014 USD, Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) terms.
4. Total amount borrowed includes formal borrowing, informal borrowing and borrowing where the source was not specified.
Table S2e: Use of Time




activities in last 
day
Minutes spent 




livestock in last 
day
Minutes spent 
on own business 
in last day
Minutes spent 
on paid labor in 
last day
Treatment (ITT): Endline 1 17.5*** 3.77** 14.5*** 1.18 -2.92
(3.57) (1.91) (1.68) (1.60) (2.65)
Observations 15327 15137 15090 15289 15307
R-squared 0.19 0.23 0.34 0.16 0.14
Control mean 169 43.6 53.5 19.0 55.2
F-test: equality of ITT coefficients across sites 6.89 1.15 36.7 0.96 1.14












Treatment (ITT): Endline 2 11.2*** 4.70** 7.65*** 0.69 -2.380
(3.72) (2.06) (1.86) (1.71) (2.63)
Observations 14501 14397 14284 14424 14493
R-squared 0.18 0.26 0.34 0.14 0.15
Control mean 185 52.4 56.7 21.1 56.8
F-test: equality of ITT coefficients across sites 2.44 1.12 14.4 0.37 0.83













1. Results presented are intent-to-treat estimates, including country Dummy variables, controls for the household's value at baseline and controls for every 
variable used in both block stratification and in re-randomization procedures
2. Dummy variables are included for Endline 1 regressions of whether the data used includes each wave of short survey data
3. Column (1) is the sum of columns (2) through (5).
Table S2f: Incomes and Revenues


















Treatment (ITT): Endline 1 30.6*** 7.69*** 4.65 3.78 0.33***
(3.94) (1.91) (3.01) (3.39) (0.05)
Observations 9712 9665 9687 8637 7100
R-squared 0.37 0.22 0.05 0.42 0.21
Control mean 73.5 37.1 12.80 93.2 3.74
F-test: equality of ITT coefficients across sites 49.1 4.29 0.99 2.88 17.1












Treatment (ITT): Endline Three 30.2*** 3.52** 5.42 4.75 0.30***
(4.74) (1.73) (3.97) (3.22) (0.05)
Observations 9494 7043 9481 9471 7035
R-squared 0.32 0.18 0.05 0.26 0.16
Control mean 80.6 40.5 14.10 69.9 3.65
F-test: equality of ITT coefficients across sites 8.0 3.39 1.79 1.17 16.0














1. Results presented are intent-to-treat estimates, including country Dummy variables, controls for the household's value at baseline and controls for every 
variable used in both block stratification and in re-randomization procedures
2. Dummy variables are included for Endline 1 regressions of whether the data used includes each wave of short survey data
3. Columns (1) to (4) are reported in 2014 USD, Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) terms.
4. See SOM Text 1 for the components included in each type of revenues and income
Table S2g: Physical and Mental Health
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Member has not 
missed any days 












Member has not 
experienced a 
period of worry 
in last year
Treatment (ITT): Endline 1 -0.0022 0.017*** 0.0270 0.14*** 0.049** -0.0043
(0.0071) (0.0057) (0.022) (0.025) (0.022) (0.011)
Observations 15504 12436 12747 12483 12449 5369
R-squared 0.33 0.20 0.18 0.14 0.070 0.50
Control mean 0.74 0.82 3.06 2.99 0.000 0.52
F-test: equality of ITT coefficients across sites 2.38 3.58 1.79 7.92 3.63 3.15














Treatment (ITT): Endline 2 0.000 0.0097 0.035* 0.066*** 0.062*** 0.0009
(0.009) (0.0059) (0.021) (0.020) (0.023) (0.012)
Observations 14820 12283 12295 14595 12295 5521
R-squared 0.10 0.25 0.20 0.17 0.075 0.41
Control mean 0.78 0.80 3.06 3.13 0.000 0.54
F-test: equality of ITT coefficients across sites 0.61 0.84 2.01 1.44 3.40 1.19















1. Results presented are intent-to-treat estimates, including country Dummy variables, controls for the household's value at baseline and controls for every variable used in both block 
stratification and in re-randomization procedures
2. See SOM Text 1 for the components included in the Activities of Daily Living Score and the absence of symptoms of mental distress index.
Physical Health Mental Health
Table S2h: Political Involvement and Women's Empowerment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)







































Treatment (ITT): Endline 1 -0.01 0.050*** 0.025*** 0.012 0.01 0.02 0.016* 0.028*** 0.00
(0.010) (0.009) (0.0090) (0.010) (0.0092) (0.0092) (0.0091) (0.011) (0.011)
Observations 8303 9426 13612 5699 10026 9816 10316 3796 8521
R-squared 0.45 0.27 0.18 0.16 0.38 0.36 0.36 0.31 0.30
Control mean 0.61 0.13 0.42 0.21 0.55 0.48 0.55 0.16 0.44
F-test: equality of ITT coefficients across sites 0.98 11.2 3.12 0.92 2.36 2.03 1.72 3.60 0.61





























Treatment (ITT): Endline 2 0.004 0.029*** 0.028*** 0.026** 0.000 0.0065 0.0100 0.013 0.0029
(0.011) (0.010) (0.009) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.016) (0.014)
Observations 8284 8824 12847 5544 8118 7873 8474 2099 6701
R-squared 0.35 0.13 0.13 0.20 0.37 0.37 0.33 0.35 0.21
Control mean 0.57 0.18 0.36 0.23 0.63 0.52 0.60 0.26 0.51
F-test: equality of ITT coefficients across sites 5.01 4.50 2.27 2.50 1.45 0.99 0.63 1.26 0.43






























1. Results presented are intent-to-treat estimates, including country Dummy variables, controls for the household's value at baseline and controls for every variable used in block stratification and in re-
randomization procedures
Political Involvement Women's Empowerment
Table S3. Bounded Attrition
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Indexed Outcomes
Lower Bound, Standardized 
Mean Treatment Effect
Upper Bound, Standardized 
Mean Treatment Effect
Lower Bound, Standardized 
Mean Treatment Effect
Upper Bound, Standardized 
Mean Treatment Effect
Lower Bound, Standardized 
Mean Treatment Effect
Upper Bound, Standardized 
Mean Treatment Effect
Lower Bound, Standardized 
Mean Treatment Effect
Upper Bound, Standardized 
Mean Treatment Effect
Total per capita consumption, standardized 0.099*** 0.186*** 0.085*** 0.133*** 0.112*** 0.145*** 0.065*** 0.144***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Food security index (5 components) 0.067*** 0.131*** 0.089*** 0.123*** 0.109*** 0.115*** 0.103*** 0.138***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Asset index 0.242*** 0.337*** 0.215*** 0.275*** 0.246*** 0.270*** 0.181*** 0.261***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Financial inclusion index (4 components) 0.366*** 0.452*** 0.330*** 0.391*** 0.211*** 0.244*** 0.128*** 0.232***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Total time spent working, standardized 0.098*** 0.127*** 0.073*** 0.123*** 0.036* 0.079*** 0.027 0.082***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Incomes and revenues index (5 components) 0.354*** 0.439*** 0.336*** 0.404*** 0.265*** 0.285*** 0.185*** 0.303***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Physical health index (3 components) 0.036* 0.069*** 0.027 0.082*** 0.021 0.061*** 0.012 0.077***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Mental health index (3 components) 0.093*** 0.127*** 0.078*** 0.141*** 0.071*** 0.119*** 0.058*** 0.130***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Political Involvement index (4 components) 0.065*** 0.090*** 0.045** 0.096*** 0.045** 0.080*** 0.039* 0.079***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Women's empowerment index (5 components) -0.014 0.094*** 0.012 0.042* -0.085*** 0.080*** -0.013 0.024
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Notes: 
(1) All indexed outcomes are measured at the household level. Adult-level outcomes are averaged at the household level, whereas in the main tables they are reported at the individual level.
(2) The pooled specification (columns 1, 2, 5, 6) trims the full sample based on the pooled attrition rates for each indexed family outcome. For every outcome measured at a given round, the bounded sample is constructed by trimming either the highest or lowest observations from the group with the higher surveyed rate for 
that variable and round to ensure equal surveyed rates for both treatment and control groups.
(3) The country specification (columns 3, 4, 7, 8) trims the full sample based on an aggregate of country-specific attrition rates for each indexed family outcome. For every outcome measured at a given round in each country, the bounded sample for that country is constructed by trimming either the highest or lowest 
observations from the group with the higher surveyed rate for that variable and round to ensure equal surveyed rates for both treatment and control groups in that country. The pooled bounded sample is thus made up of the country-specific bounded samples.
Bounding Estimates use Pooled Attrition Rates Bounding Estimates use Country-Specific Attrition Rates
Endline 1 Endline 2
Bounding Estimates use Pooled Attrition Rates Bounding Estimates use Country-Specific Attrition Rates












q-value for all 
10 hypotheses
Total per capita consumption, standardized 0.239*** 0.001 0.347*** 0.001
(0.068) (0.074)
Food security index (5 components) 0.139** 0.037 0.186*** 0.004
(0.061) (0.061)
Asset index 0.499*** 0.001 0.604*** 0.001
(0.059) (0.065)
Financial inclusion index (4 components) 1.907*** 0.001 0.799*** 0.001
(0.107) (0.111)
Total time spent working, standardized 0.331*** 0.001 0.225*** 0.001
(0.067) (0.063)
Incomes and revenues index (5 components) 1.438*** 0.001 0.293*** 0.001
(0.191) (0.074)
Physical health index (3 components) -0.034 0.592 0.041 0.504
(0.054) (0.049)
Mental health index (3 components) 0.047 0.477 -0.037 0.581
(0.053) (0.058)
Political Involvement index (4 components) 0.070 0.208 0.111** 0.048
(0.048) (0.052)
Women's empowerment index (5 components) -0.007 0.891 -0.005 0.920
(0.051) (0.054)
Endline 1 Endline 2
Table S4a: Indexed Family Outcome Variables and Aggregates, Ethiopia
Notes:
1. Results presented are mean standardized intent-to-treat estimates, including controls for the household's value at baseline and controls for geographic units 
used for block stratification
2. See SOM Text 2 for the components of each index












q-value for all 
10 hypotheses
Total per capita consumption, standardized 0.097** 0.068 0.136*** 0.018
(0.049) (0.050)
Food security index (5 components) 0.065 0.168 0.077* 0.144
(0.044) (0.045)
Asset index 0.247*** 0.001 0.342*** 0.001
(0.049) (0.057)
Financial inclusion index (4 components) 0.261*** 0.001 0.341*** 0.001
(0.060) (0.080)
Total time spent working, standardized 0.026 0.638 0.042 0.558
(0.056) (0.049)
Incomes and revenues index (5 components) 0.156*** 0.004 0.330*** 0.001
(0.049) (0.063)
Physical health index (3 components) 0.114** 0.053 -0.011 0.847
(0.053) (0.055)
Mental health index (3 components) 0.177*** 0.003 0.035 0.665
(0.052) (0.057)
Political Involvement index (4 components) 0.179*** 0.003 0.099* 0.144
(0.054) (0.055)
Women's empowerment index (5 components) 0.045 0.438 0.029 0.665
(0.053) (0.054)
Table S4b: Indexed Family Outcome Variables and Aggregates, Ghana
Endline 1 Endline 2
Notes:
1. Results presented are mean standardized intent-to-treat estimates, including controls for the household's value at baseline and controls for geographic units 
used for block stratification and variables used in re-randomization to ensure balance
2. Dummy variables are included for Endline 1 regressions for whether the values include each wave of short survey data
3. See SOM Text 2 for the components of each index












q-value for all 
10 hypotheses
Total per capita consumption, standardized 0.011 0.839 -0.070 0.306
(0.049) (0.049)
Food security index (5 components) 0.136*** 0.011 0.088* 0.203
(0.047) (0.051)
Asset index 0.010 0.839 -0.096** 0.149
(0.051) (0.048)
Financial inclusion index (4 components) 0.199*** 0.002 0.063 0.429
(0.055) (0.060)
Total time spent working, standardized 0.086*** 0.020 0.038 0.429
(0.033) (0.036)
Incomes and revenues index (5 components) 0.237*** 0.001 0.230*** 0.002
(0.051) (0.060)
Physical health index (3 components) 0.067* 0.124 0.036 0.456
(0.037) (0.040)
Mental health index (3 components) 0.138*** 0.003 0.099** 0.091
(0.041) (0.042)
Political Involvement index (4 components) -0.024 0.653 -0.013 0.820
(0.037) (0.039)
Women's empowerment index (5 components) 0.033 0.653 0.003 0.952
(0.049) (0.053)
Table S4c: Indexed Family Outcome Variables and Aggregates, Honduras
Endline 1 Endline 2
Notes:
1. Results presented are mean standardized intent-to-treat estimates, including controls for the household's value at baseline and controls for geographic units 
used for block stratification and variables used in re-randomization to ensure balance
2. Dummy variables are included for Endline 1 regressions for whether the values include each wave of short survey data
3. See SOM Text 2 for the components of each index












q-value for all 
9    hypotheses
Total per capita consumption, standardized 0.296*** 0.001 0.228*** 0.002
(0.080) (0.066)
Food security index (5 components) 0.238*** 0.002 0.278*** 0.001
(0.068) (0.063)
Asset index 0.650*** 0.001 0.712*** 0.001
(0.089) (0.096)
Financial inclusion index (4 components) 0.214* 0.141 0.222*** 0.007
(0.129) (0.077)
Total time spent working, standardized 0.279*** 0.001 0.119*** 0.010
(0.049) (0.044)
Incomes and revenues index (5 components) 0.608*** 0.001 0.666*** 0.001
(0.114) (0.099)
Physical health index (3 components) 0.160** 0.025 -0.017 0.746
(0.065) (0.051)
Mental health index (3 components) 0.077 0.220 0.058 0.305
(0.060) (0.053)
Political Involvement index (4 components) -0.007 0.888 0.141*** 0.004
(0.050) (0.046)
Women's empowerment index (5 components) 0.087 0.211
(0.063)
Table S4d: Indexed Family Outcome Variables and Aggregates, India
Endline 1 Endline 2
Notes:
1. Results presented are mean standardized intent-to-treat estimates, including controls for the household's value at baseline and controls for geographic units 
used for block stratification
2. See SOM Text 2 for the components of each index






q-value for all 





q-value for all 
10 hypotheses
Total per capita consumption, standardized 0.171*** 0.018 0.117* 0.230
(0.064) (0.067)
Food security index (5 components) 0.117** 0.055 0.058 0.404
(0.056) (0.059)
Asset index 0.325*** 0.001 0.170** 0.056
(0.063) (0.067)
Financial inclusion index (4 components) 0.011 0.846 -0.052 0.488
(0.058) (0.068)
Total time spent working, standardized 0.017 0.741 0.042 0.390
(0.038) (0.038)
Incomes and revenues index (5 components) 0.101 0.190 0.128* 0.230
(0.069) (0.076)
Physical health index (3 components) -0.095** 0.048 -0.002 0.959
(0.043) (0.047)
Mental health index (3 components) 0.054 0.366
(0.044)
Political Involvement index (4 components) 0.172*** 0.001 0.120*** 0.056
(0.043) (0.044)
Women's empowerment index (5 components) 0.168*** 0.004 0.077 0.271
(0.052) (0.051)
Endline 1 Endline 2
Notes:
1. Results presented are mean standardized intent-to-treat estimates, including controls for the household's value at baseline and controls for variables used in 
block stratification
2. See SOM Text 2 for the components of each index
Table S4e: Indexed Family Outcome Variables and Aggregates, Pakistan












q-value for all 
10 hypotheses
Total per capita consumption, standardized 0.048 0.627 0.096* 0.215
(0.048) (0.056)
Food security index (5 components) 0.020 0.756 0.064 0.265
(0.052) (0.045)
Asset index 0.102** 0.081 0.060 0.265
(0.042) (0.042)
Financial inclusion index (4 components) 0.016 0.756 0.051 0.515
(0.048) (0.061)
Total time spent working, standardized 0.012 0.756 -0.029 0.584
(0.039) (0.045)
Incomes and revenues index (5 components) 0.122*** 0.081 0.108* 0.215
(0.047) (0.061)
Physical health index (3 components) 0.085** 0.155 0.100** 0.165
(0.043) (0.047)
Mental health index (3 components) 0.059 0.541 0.174*** 0.002
(0.048) (0.047)
Political Involvement index (4 components) 0.021 0.756 -0.006 0.891
(0.042) (0.046)
Women's empowerment index (5 components) -0.026 0.756 0.058 0.503
(0.059) (0.062)
Endline 1 Endline 2
Notes:
1. Results presented are mean standardized intent-to-treat estimates, including controls for the household's value at baseline and controls for geographic units 
used for block stratification and variables used in re-randomization to ensure balance
2. Dummy variables are included for Endline 1 regressions for whether the values include each wave of short survey data
3. See SOM Text 2 for the components of each index
Table S4f: Indexed Family Outcome Variables and Aggregates, Peru














Ethiopia 6.83*** 2.42 3.67*** 0.41
(1.93) (1.48) (0.85) (0.33)
Observations 915 915 915 915
R-squared 0.06 0.03 0.05 0.02
Control mean 41.7 27.1 13.4 1.2
Baseline mean 47.5 33.10 14.4
Ghana 2.82** 2.18** 0.44 0.05
(1.42) (1.04) (0.76) (0.037)
Observations 2525 2525 2525 2525
R-squared 0.19 0.18 0.10 0.07
Control mean 40.8 30.1 10.3 0.34
Baseline mean 54.4 44.90 9.5 0.47
Honduras 0.61 3.45** -2.55 -0.51
(2.70) (1.51) (1.85) (0.64)
Observations 2287 2286 2282 2287
R-squared 0.14 0.12 0.07 0.07
Control mean 79.6 45.1 30.5 4.1
Baseline mean 46.3 34.10 10.9 1.51
India (Bandhan) 6.51*** 4.96*** 1.77** -0.31
(1.75) (1.17) (0.88) (0.37)
Observations 816 816 816 816
R-squared 0.28 0.27 0.17 0.18
Control mean 47.8 32.6 13.0 2.2
Baseline mean 39.9 26.30 12.7 0.97
Pakistan 8.86*** 3.92** 4.25** 0.48
(3.31) (1.78) (2.05) (0.34)
Observations 1041 1041 1041 1042
R-squared 0.16 0.15 0.13 0.06
Control mean 86.9 52.9 31.9 2.2
Baseline mean 133.0 78.60 50.3 3.72
Peru 4.18 5.70* -1.58 -0.08
(4.14) (3.22) (2.43) (0.15)
Observations 2104 2104 2105 2103
R-squared 0.22 0.23 0.08 0.10
Control mean 147.0 101.0 44.9 1.8
Baseline mean 104.0 77.90 24.4
Notes:
1. Results presented are intent-to-treat estimates, including controls for the household's value at baseline and controls for 
every variable used in block stratification and in re-randomization procedures
2. Dummy variables are included for whether the values include each wave of short survey data
3. All values reported in 2014 USD, Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) terms
4.  Column (1) is the sum of columns (2) through (4). 
Table S5a-1: Per Capita Consumption by Country, Endline 1
















Ethiopia 7.37*** 2.02** 3.97*** 1.04***
(1.58) (0.86) (0.95) (0.30)
Observations 908 908 908 908
R-squared 0.11 0.09 0.06 0.03
Control mean 40.4 25.9 13.9 0.6
Baseline mean 47.5 33.10 14.4
Ghana 3.22*** 2.41*** 0.55 0.03
(1.19) (0.81) (0.66) (0.04)
Observations 2434 2434 2438 2442
R-Squared 0.16 0.16 0.08 0.10
Control mean 30.40 20.00 8.63 0.34
Baseline mean 54.40 44.90 9.50 0.47
Honduras -4.45 -0.60 -2.28 -1.72**
(3.11) (1.28) (2.26) (0.85)
Observations 2229 2227 2229 2229
R-squared 0.12 0.09 0.08 0.06
Control mean 76.8 38.6 34.3 3.96
Baseline mean 46.3 34.10 10.90 1.51
India (Bandhan) 6.18*** 3.02*** 2.55*** 0.55
(1.78) (1.11) (0.86) (0.41)
Observations 879 879 879 879
R-squared 0.28 0.27 0.29 0.17
Control mean 57.5 36.6 18.9 1.95
Baseline mean 39.9 26.30 12.70 0.97
Pakistan 5.98* 2.91 2.84 0.07
(3.40) (1.80) (2.09) (0.47)
Observations 1016 1016 1016 1016
R-squared 0.12 0.11 0.12 0.08
Control mean 85.1 50.4 31.5 3.17
Baseline mean 133.0 78.60 50.3 3.72
Peru 6.18* 6.25** -0.07 0.19
(3.59) (2.58) (2.10) (0.46)
Observations 2029 2029 2033 2020
R-squared 0.12 0.12 0.08 0.04
Control mean 119.0 75.8 40.3 2.74
Baseline mean 104.0 77.90 24.4
Notes:
1. Results presented are intent-to-treat estimates, including controls for the household's value at baseline and controls for 
every variable used in block stratification and in re-randomization procedures
2. All values reported in 2014 USD, Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) terms
3.  Column (1) is the sum of columns (2) through (4). 
Table S5a-2: Per Capita Consumption by Country, Endline 2
Table S5b-1: Food Security by Country, Endline 1







No one in the 
household 








two meals per 
day
Ethiopia 0.039 0.063** 0.029* 0.045** 0.018
(0.031) (0.030) (0.017) (0.022) (0.018)
Observations 914 910 910 910 909
R-squared 0.067 0.064 0.030 0.042 0.015
Control mean 0.64 0.66 0.91 0.85 0.91
Baseline mean 0.34 0.37 0.74 0.49 0.83
Ghana 0.0280 0.0210 0.039* 0.0035
-0.0200 -0.0200 -0.0230 -0.0250
Observations 2501 2501 2499 2500
R-squared 0.26 0.20 0.14 0.15
Control mean 0.27 0.26 0.71 0.45
Baseline mean 0.15 0.12 0.50 0.41
Honduras 0.060*** 0.021* 0.034*
(0.023) (0.013) (0.019)
Observations 2255 2255 2188
R-squared 0.084 0.076 0.045
Control mean 0.67 0.92 0.82
Baseline mean 0.61 0.82 0.79
India (Bandhan) 0.080*** 0.13*** 0.013 0.013
(0.025) (0.030) (0.027) (0.019)
Observations 814 814 815 815
R-squared 0.21 0.26 0.26 0.25
Control mean 0.11 0.68 0.81 0.91
Baseline mean 0.09 0.28 0.62 0.77
Pakistan 0.039 0.063** 0.029* 0.045** 0.018
(0.031) (0.030) (0.017) (0.022) (0.018)
Observations 914 910 910 910 909
R-squared 0.067 0.064 0.030 0.042 0.015
Control mean 0.64 0.66 0.91 0.85 0.91
Baseline mean 0.34 0.37 0.74 0.49 0.83
Peru 0.039 0.063** 0.029*
(0.031) (0.030) (0.017)
Observations 914 910 910
R-squared 0.067 0.064 0.030
Control mean 0.64 0.66 0.91
Baseline mean 0.34 0.37 0.74
Notes:
1. Results presented are intent-to-treat estimates, including controls for the household's value at baseline and controls for every 
variable used in block stratification and in re-randomization procedures
Table S5b-2: Food Security by Country, Endline 2







No one in the 
household 








two meals per 
day
Ethiopia 0.077** 0.051* 0.041*** 0.047** 0.03
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Observations 907 907 906 904 906
R-squared 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.01
Control mean 0.64 0.69 0.92 0.83 0.92
Baseline mean 0.34 0.37 0.74 0.49 0.83
Ghana 0.0140 0.0290 0.0300 0.0310
-0.0220 -0.0210 -0.0230 -0.0240
Observations 2438 2438 2437 2436
R-Squared 0.15 0.20 0.18 0.21
Control mean 0.25 0.23 0.73 0.44
Baseline mean 0.15 0.12 0.50 0.41
Honduras 0.038 0.021 0.027
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Observations 2224 2224 2113
R-squared 0.10 0.07 0.07
Control mean 0.58 0.90 0.80
Baseline mean 0.61 0.82 0.79
India (Bandhan) 0.14*** 0.13*** 0.038* 0.061*** 0.026**
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
Observations 877 877 877 877 877
R-squared 0.22 0.21 0.18 0.24 0.16
Control mean 0.43 0.43 0.85 0.90 0.95
Baseline mean 0.11 0.09 0.28 0.62 0.77
Pakistan 0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.049** 0.02
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
Observations 1021 1021 1021 1021 1021
R-squared 0.11 0.14 0.14 0.10 0.10
Control mean 0.69 0.68 0.72 0.81 0.89
Baseline mean 0.33 0.31 0.34 0.57 0.75
Peru 0.04 0.01 0.02
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
Observations 2017 2017 1934
R-squared 0.17 0.05 0.13
Control mean 0.58 0.94 0.87
Baseline mean 0.73 0.90 0.00
Table S5c-1: Asset Ownership by Country, Endline 1












Ethiopia 0.50*** 1,037*** 0.51*** 832*** 0.082 50.9***
(0.06) (104.00) (0.06) (83.90) (0.06) (17.60)
Observations 915 915 915 915 915 910
R-squared 0.26 0.17 0.26 0.17 0.23 0.04
Control mean 0.00 1,379 0.00 1,030 0.00 172
Baseline mean 0.08 0.09 -0.01
Ghana 0.25*** 0.25*** 0.07
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Observations 2584 2584 2583
R-squared 0.32 0.28 0.42
Control mean 0.00 0.00 0.00
Baseline mean 0.00 0.00 0.00
Honduras 0.01 106** 0.02 104** -0.047 -17.50
(0.05) (53.70) (0.05) (45.70) (0.04) (20.20)
Observations 2259 2261 2259 2261 2255 2255
R-squared 0.11 0.31 0.08 0.26 0.32 0.27
Control mean 0.00 1,417 0.00 780.00 0.00 640.00
Baseline mean -0.01 548.00 -0.01 342.00 0.00 201.00
India (Bandhan) 0.65*** 0.66*** 0.08
(0.09) (0.09) (0.07)
Observations 817 817 816
R-squared 0.29 0.30 0.18
Control mean 0.00 0.00 0.00
Baseline mean 0.04 0.04 -0.03
Pakistan 0.33*** 0.35*** 0.07
(0.06) (0.07) (0.05)
Observations 1083 1083 1054
R-squared 0.18 0.16 0.36
Control mean 0.00 0 0.00
Baseline mean 0.03 0.04 0.01
Peru 0.10** 168* 0.10** 172* 0.018 11.30
(0.04) (101.00) (0.04) (92.80) (0.05) (18.60)
Observations 2062 2062 2062 2062 2061 2061
R-squared 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.40 0.27 0.21
Control mean 0.00 4,369 0.00 3,588 0.00 774
Baseline mean 0.02 3,845 0.02 3,110 -0.02 728
Notes:
1. Results presented are intent-to-treat estimates, including controls for the household's value at baseline and controls for every variable used in block 
stratification and in re-randomization procedures
2. Columns (2), (4) and (6) are reported in 2014 USD, Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) terms.
3. Columns (1), (3) and (5) report indices that weight assets based on their relative values, and are standardized to each country’s control group mean 
in every time period. See SOM Text 1 for details of the calculations used to construct the asset indices
Table S5c-2: Asset Ownership by Country, Endline 2












Ethiopia 0.60*** 1,077*** 0.60*** 851*** 0.20*** 62.9***
(0.07) (109.00) (0.07) (87.40) (0.06) (15.80)
Observations 908 908 908 908 908 908
R-squared 0.25 0.17 0.25 0.17 0.19 0.05
Control mean 0.00 1,580 0.00 1,175.00 0.00 177.00
Baseline mean 0.08 0.09 -0.01
Ghana 0.34*** 0.34*** 0.16***
(0.06) (0.06) (0.05)
Observations 2442 2442 2442
R-Squared 0.30 0.27 0.37
Control mean 0.00 0.00 0.00
Baseline mean 0.00 0.00 0.00
Honduras -0.096** 13.00 -0.06 32.30 -0.087** -19.90
(0.05) (65.10) (0.05) (56.00) (0.04) (18.20)
Observations 2226 2229 2226 2229 2225 2225
R-squared 0.08 0.26 0.08 0.23 0.06 0.30
Control mean 0.00 1,558 0.00 1,002 0.00 545
Baseline mean -0.01 548 -0.01 342 0.00 201
India (Bandhan) 0.71*** 0.70*** 0.20***
(0.10) (0.10) (0.07)
Observations 879 879 877
R-squared 0.29 0.28 0.20
Control mean 0.00 0.00 0.00
Baseline mean 0.04 0.04 -0.03
Pakistan 0.17** 270*** 0.18** 163*** 0.04 6.55
(0.07) (103.00) (0.07) (62.50) (0.05) (7.61)
Observations 1027 1017 1027 1027 1017 1017
R-squared 0.15 0.12 0.14 0.12 0.41 0.32
Control mean 0.00 918 0.00 436.00 0.00 150.00
Baseline mean 0.03 0.04 0.01
Peru 0.06 92.00 0.05 58.60 0.084* 37.10
(0.04) (104.00) (0.04) (79.40) (0.05) (43.20)
Observations 2026 2027 2026 2027 2019 2020
R-squared 0.33 0.28 0.33 0.34 0.27 0.13
Control mean 0.00 3,886.00 0.00 2,780.00 0.00 1,071.00
Baseline mean 0.02 3,845.00 0.02 3,110.00 -0.02 728.00
Notes:
1. Results presented are intent-to-treat estimates, including controls for the household's value at baseline and controls for every variable used in block 
stratification and in re-randomization procedures
2. Columns (2), (4) and (6) are reported in 2014 USD, Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) terms.
3. Columns (1), (3) and (5) report indices that weight assets based on their relative values, and are standardized to each country’s control group mean 
in every time period. See SOM Text 1 for details of the calculations used to construct the asset indices
Table S5d-1: Financial Inclusion by Country, Endline 1



















Ethiopia 45.3** 16.30 31.0** 707*** 36.2***
(18.10) (13.70) (12.40) (32.10) (3.69)
Observations 915 915 915 915 915
R-squared 0.044 0.036 0.027 0.37 0.102
Control mean 117.00 98 18.60 75.80 8.36





Control mean 17.30 7.15
Baseline mean 22.90 3.85
Honduras 3.48 15.40 -9.21 55.0*** 3.85**
(25.70) (22.80) (7.27) (10.50) (1.93)
Observations 2279 2254 2254 2279 2254
R-squared 0.11 0.082 0.09 0.069 0.044
Control mean 217.00 183 29.30 60.80 6.73
Baseline mean 146.00 91.00 55.40 136 0.73
India (Bandhan) -20.00 -15.90 -0.021 1.85**
(33.90) (28.00) (6.17) (0.90)
Observations 817 817 817 817
R-squared 0.24 0.18 0.21 0.20
Control mean 332.00 223 55.80 1.57
Baseline mean 217.00 210.00 6.85 3.05
Pakistan -57.60 -62.00 -0.03 0.79
(66.00) (66.50) (4.20) (0.71)
Observations 1073 1071 1071 1073
R-squared 0.16 0.15 0.16 0.056
Control mean 492.00 485 6.06 1.29
Baseline mean 997.00 926.00 12.20 0.77
Peru 28.10 25.50 2.64 1.97 -0.56
(44.20) (42.60) (14.20) (34.10) (4.02)
Observations 2101 2101 2101 2101 2056
R-squared 0.068 0.056 0.027 0.050 0.047
Control mean 227 194 30.50 266 28
Baseline mean 141.00 129.0 11.10 44.10 13.90
Notes:
1. Results presented are intent-to-treat estimates, including controls for the household's value at baseline and controls for every 
variable used in block stratification and in re-randomization procedures
2. Dummy variables are included for whether the values include each wave of short survey data
3. All values are reported in 2014 USD, Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) terms.
4. Total amount borrowed includes formal borrowing, informal borrowing and borrowing where the source was not specified.
Table S5d-2: Financial Inclusion by Country, Endline 2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Total amount 




sources, last 12 
months
Amount borrowed 






Ethiopia 61.3*** 24.9** 36.2** 272*** 8.16*
(19.70) (9.72) (16.90) (36.10) (4.27)
Observations 908 908 908 908 908
R-squared 0.038 0.049 0.024 0.085 0.030
Control mean 147 116 29.80 73.10 6.50





Control mean 22.50 5.49
Baseline mean 22.90 3.85
Honduras 4.02 5.15 -0.33 31.70 1.440
(33.90) (32.90) (11.90) (21.70) (1.83)
Observations 2224 2223 2224 2221 2220
R-squared 0.12 0.10 0.09 0.066 0.061
Control mean 336 295 44.50 82.10 8.62
Baseline mean 146 91.00 55.40 136 0.73
India (Bandhan) 115*** 25.00 90.4*** 4.16
(38.30) (33.60) (15.30) (3.32)
Observations 879 879 879 879
R-squared 0.22 0.24 0.22 0.197
Control mean 287.00 231 53.90 20.70
Baseline mean 217.00 210.00 6.85 3.05
Pakistan -193** -203** 2.93 3.790
(97.00) (96.80) (5.79) (8.25)
Observations 1011 1011 1011 1016
R-squared 0.13 0.12 0.41 0.060
Control mean 825.00 812 12.70 13.50
Baseline mean 997.00 926.00 12.20 0.77
Peru -52.40 -60.10 11.70 45.1* 2.560
(57.80) (56.90) (11.90) (23.80) (4.30)
Observations 2016 2016 2016 2017 2017
R-squared 0.07 0.07 0.03 0.053 0.064
Control mean 291 271.00 14.80 175.00 42.90
Baseline mean 141.00 129.00 11.10 44.10 13.90
Notes:
1. Results presented are intent-to-treat estimates, including controls for the household's value at baseline and controls for every variable used in block 
stratification and in re-randomization procedures
2. All values are reported in 2014 USD, Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) terms.
3. Total amount borrowed includes formal borrowing, informal borrowing and borrowing where the source was not specified.
Table S5e-1: Use of Time by Country, Endline 1















business in last 
day
Minutes spent 
on paid labor 
in last day
Ethiopia 57.2*** 21.5** 33.6*** 6.51* -3.71
(11.60) (8.99) (7.30) (3.38) (6.09)
Observations 897 897 897 897 897
R-squared 0.11 0.12 0.07 0.03 0.03
Control mean 225.00 96.40 80.30 2.86 45.00
Baseline mean 118.00 18.40 39.70 2.65 57.00
Ghana 5.28 0.82 1.99*** 1.75 -0.24
(11.20) (9.40) (0.63) (8.00) (1.89)
Observations 2377 2377 2377 2377 2376
R-squared 0.17 0.14 0.09 0.10 0.10
Control mean 147.00 102.00 0.36 38.50 6.69
Baseline mean 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Honduras 9.42* 3.34 2.18** -1.09 4.88
(5.35) (2.62) (0.89) (2.56) (4.44)
Observations 4585 4404 4357 4563 4574
R-squared 0.14 0.11 0.05 0.10 0.12
Control mean 114.00 25.00 10.80 11.00 69.10
Baseline mean 165.00 76.70 3.08 11.20 79.60
India (Bandhan) 58.6*** 1.32 64.7*** 6.26 -13.70
(10.30) (1.62) (4.95) (6.99) (8.84)
Observations 1505 1505 1505 1505 1505
R-squared 0.21 0.16 0.27 0.22 0.20
Control mean 216.00 4.31 32.40 61.20 118.00
Baseline mean 169.00 1.36 15.70 19.20 133.00
Pakistan 4.07 3.11 6.74* -1.58 -6.21
(9.19) (4.58) (3.54) (2.86) (7.86)
Observations 2672 2675 2674 2676 2675
R-squared 0.15 0.23 0.11 0.08 0.08
Control mean 172.00 44.00 36.50 11.20 80.10
Baseline mean 140.00 39.20 31.10 10.00 59.60
Peru 9.52 0.77 3.98 1.99 -1.48
(7.71) (3.30) (5.64) (2.17) (4.48)
Observations 3291 3279 3280 3271 3280
R-squared 0.069 0.092 0.13 0.063 0.055
Control mean 232.00 23.10 160.00 9.51 42.70
Baseline mean 25.30 7.28 11.70 10.10
Notes:
1. Results presented are intent-to-treat estimates, including controls for the household's value at baseline and controls for every variable 
used in block stratification and in re-randomization procedures
2. Dummy variables are included for whether the values include each wave of short survey data
3. Column (1) is the sum of columns (2) through (5).
4. In Ghana, the adult survey was asked almost exclusively to women. In other sites, adult survey was asked to both men and women. 
Very few respondents in Ghana  tended to livestock.
Table S5e-2: Use of Time by Country, Endline 2















business in last 
day
Minutes spent 
on paid labor 
in last day
Ethiopia 42.5*** 20.8** 29.1*** 3.96 -10.60
(12.00) (10.20) (7.49) (2.84) (6.49)
Observations 891 891 891 891 891
R-squared 0.11 0.09 0.05 0.03 0.05
Control mean 245.00 125.00 75.70 3.59 40.40
Baseline mean 118.00 18.40 39.70 2.65 57.00
Ghana 10.00 10.90 0.97 2.65 -3.73
-11.70 -10.80 -0.77 -6.18 -2.77
Observations 2279 2279 2279 2279 2279
R-Squared 0.188 0.195 0.061 0.082 0.054
Control mean 171.000 136.000 0.860 27.200 6.910
Baseline mean 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Honduras 6.51 1.94 2.15* -1.28 3.61
(6.18) (3.03) (1.17) (3.34) (4.90)
Observations 4363 4262 4152 4322 4356
R-squared 0.11 0.08 0.02 0.06 0.13
Control mean 125.00 28.00 14.00 15.80 68.30
Baseline mean 165.00 76.70 3.08 11.20 79.60
India (Bandhan) 24.6*** -0.11 28.7*** 2.81 -7.12
(9.16) (1.86) (3.58) (6.08) (8.37)
Observations 1759 1759 1759 1759 1759
R-squared 0.16 0.10 0.24 0.21 0.18
Control mean 225.00 5.81 27.70 60.80 131.00
Baseline mean 169.00 1.36 15.70 19.20 133.00
Pakistan 9.77 5.72 3.86 -0.15 -1.37
(8.91) (4.52) (3.97) (3.65) (7.12)
Observations 2309 2317 2316 2316 2314
R-squared 0.12 0.13 0.10 0.14 0.07
Control mean 168.00 35.90 41.10 20.80 71.20
Baseline mean 140.00 39.20 31.10 10.00 59.60
Peru -6.32 0.82 -7.19 0.27 -3.82
(9.93) (4.19) (7.49) (2.46) (5.53)
Observations 2,900 2,889 2,887 2,857 2,894
R-squared 0.07 0.07 0.10 0.06 0.09
Control mean 264.00 29.10 176.00 12.10 47.70
Baseline mean 25.30 0.00 7.28 11.70 10.10
Notes:
1. Results presented are intent-to-treat estimates, including controls for the household's value at baseline and controls for every variable 
used in block stratification and in re-randomization procedures
2. Column (1) is the sum of columns (2) through (5).
3. In Ghana, the adult survey was asked almost exclusively to women. In other sites, adult survey was asked to both men and women. 
Very few respondents in Ghana  tended to livestock.
Table S5f-1: Incomes and Revenues by Country, Endline 1




















Ethiopia 107*** 4.20** 9.98** -2.33 1.13***
(7.24) (1.91) (4.07) (2.45) (0.15)
Observations 915 915 915 915 913
R-squared 0.26 0.08 0.02 0.03 0.09
Control mean 27.0 21.4 3.39 29 3.73
Baseline mean 7.55 14.8 0.00 8.3 3.74
Ghana 1.31 0.61 5.32*** 0.84*
(1.23) (0.62) (1.82) (0.48)
Observations 2519 2531 2522 2525
R-squared 0.13 0.38 0.06 0.03
Control mean 9.2 6.5 6.90 1.88
Baseline mean 31.8 9.73 3.12
Honduras 11.7*** 14.1** -3.43 22.3** 0.42***
(1.89) (6.78) (7.00) (10.30) (0.11)
Observations 2285 2258 2281 2277 2250
R-squared 0.07 0.11 0.05 0.29 0.11
Control mean 10.5 71.0 22.40 217 3.19
Baseline mean 3.25 -2.1 -0.45 84.8 2.45
India (Bandhan) 48.0*** -0.42 2.77 6.62 0.21***
(7.98) (0.43) (3.44) (5.46) (0.07)
Observations 815 817 798 817 814
R-squared 0.27 0.25 0.27 0.20 0.25
Control mean 13.0 0.0 25.20 57 2.77
Baseline mean 0.00 0.2 -0.76 0.1 1.97
Pakistan 1.86 7.17 4.30 -0.16
(4.49) (4.79) (10.60) (0.14)
Observations 1074 1083 1068 1067
R-squared 0.15 0.12 0.05 0.09
Control mean 13.5 16.9 -14.70 5.57
Baseline mean 18.80 0.018 3.16
Peru 36.7** 12.9*** 12.50 -9.70 0.16*
(17.40) (4.55) (9.23) (8.43) (0.10)
Observations 2104 2061 2103 2103 2056
R-squared 0.19 0.12 0.04 0.11 0.10
Control mean 285.0 65.5 20.20 113 3.92
Baseline mean 33.90 37.8 13.20 45.9
Notes:
1. Results presented are intent-to-treat estimates, including controls for the household's value at baseline and controls for every 
variable used in block stratification and in re-randomization procedures
2. Dummy variables are included for whether the values include each wave of short survey data
3. Columns (1) to (4) are reported in 2014 USD, Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) terms.
4. See SOM Text 1 for the components included in each type of revenues and income
Table S5f-2: Incomes and Revenues by Country, Endline 2




















Ethiopia 26.6*** 5.90*** -0.82 -2.20 0.90***
(5.38) (2.05) (2.71) (2.30) (0.12)
Observations 908 908 908 908 907
R-squared 0.08 0.16 0.01 0.06 0.10
Control mean 25.4 29.8 14.20 26 4.33
Baseline mean 7.55 14.8 0.00 8.3 3.74
Ghana 13.6*** 6.13*** 0.24
(2.43) (1.92) (0.67)
Observations 2436 2438 2438
R-Squared 0.21 0.08 0.04
Control mean 27.00 6.73 2.39
Baseline mean 9.73 3.12
Honduras 14.9*** 11.5*** 8.25 12.10 0.31***
(4.15) (4.07) (9.12) (7.97) (0.11)
Observations 2229 2225 2225 2216 2221
R-squared 0.03 0.12 0.03 0.15 0.07
Control mean 27.7 51.6 22.40 159 3.27
Baseline mean 3.25 -2.1 -0.45 84.8 2.45
India (Bandhan) 61.7*** 0.45 15.0*** 3.96 0.28***
(8.34) (0.87) (5.80) (2.46) (0.08)
Observations 879 879 877 879 877
R-squared 0.24 0.13 0.23 0.19 0.23
Control mean 16.6 0.4 37.70 4 3.37
Baseline mean 0.00 0.2 -0.76 0.1 1.97
Pakistan 27.1*** 0.63 -7.29 10.40 -0.052
(9.94) (2.88) (20.70) (13.70) (0.12)
Observations 1017 1009 1014 1015 1014
R-squared 0.29 0.18 0.04 0.08 0.08
Control mean 43.4 14.7 2.14 72 4.65
Baseline mean 18.80 0.02 155.0 3.16
Peru 43.3** -3.31 11.0* 4.850 0.16*
(20.70) (4.83) (6.48) (8.75) (0.09)
Observations 2025 2022 2019 2015 2016
R-squared 0.14 0.10 0.05 0.07 0.10
Control mean 264.0 53.70 12 97.90 3.56
Baseline mean 33.90 37.80 13.2 45.90 0.00
Notes:
1. Results presented are intent-to-treat estimates, including controls for the household's value at baseline and controls for every variable 
used in block stratification and in re-randomization procedures
2. Columns (1) to (4) are reported in 2014 USD, Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) terms.
3. See SOM Text 1 for the components included in each type of revenues and income
Table S5g-1: Physical and Mental Health by Country, Endline 1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Member has 
not missed any 

















worry in last 
year
Ethiopia -0.003 -0.014 -0.018 0.14** -0.020 0.002
(0.011) (0.015) (0.062) (0.067) (0.055) (0.019)
Observations 1531 1518 1518 1537 1537 1537
R-squared 0.004 0.079 0.069 0.058 0.016 0.012
Control mean 0.95 0.86 3.62 3.52 0.00 0.86
Baseline mean 0.91 0.87 3.94 3.52 0.00 0.85
Ghana 0.011 0.041*** 0.16*** 0.12** 0.032
(0.028) (0.015) (0.050) (0.052) (0.022)
Observations 2277 2336 2373 2333 2332
R-squared 0.085 0.20 0.144 0.104 0.091
Control mean 0.63 0.85 2.83 0.00 0.21
Baseline mean 0.71 0.88 2.61 0.00 0.00
Honduras 0.012 0.020** 0.07 0.15*** 0.12***
(0.015) (0.010) (0.051) (0.055) (0.041)
Observations 4542 3999 3992 3994 3999
R-squared 0.029 0.148 0.036 0.051 0.035
Control mean 0.82 0.84 3.24 3.22 0.00
Baseline mean 0.96 0.67 3.34 0.00
India (Bandhan) 0.031** 0.024* 0.022 0.13*** 0.11* -0.042***
(0.013) (0.014) (0.034) (0.041) (0.057) (0.016)
Observations 1505 1505 1504 1502 1502 1500
R-squared 0.15 0.31 0.18 0.18 0.22 0.14
Control mean 0.020 0.65 2.29 2.42 0.00 0.93





Control mean 0.79 3.40
Baseline mean 0.56 2.86
Peru 0.006 0.02 0.11** 0.14*** -0.062
(0.016) (0.012) (0.047) (0.049) (0.046)
Observations 2987 3078 3078 3077 3078
R-squared 0.038 0.11 0.106 0.094 0.054
Control mean 0.84 0.82 2.70 2.83 0.00
Baseline mean 0.94 0.67 2.61 2.60
Notes:
1. Results presented are intent-to-treat estimates, including controls for the household's value at baseline and controls for every variable used in block 
stratification and in re-randomization procedures
2. See SOM Text 1 for the components included in the Activities of Daily Living Score and the absence of symptoms of mental distress index.
3. In Ghana, the adult survey was asked almost exclusively to women. In other sites, adult survey was asked to both men and women.
Physical Health Mental Health
Table S5g-2: Physical and Mental Health by Country, Endline 2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Member has 
not missed any 

















worry in last 
year
Ethiopia 0.007 0.020 -0.038 0.079 -0.056 -0.023*
(0.010) (0.014) (0.057) (0.056) (0.059) (0.014)
Observations 1469 1460 1460 1471 1471 1470
R-squared 0.009 0.055 0.101 0.044 0.022 0.025
Control mean 0.96 0.88 3.73 3.55 0.00 0.94
Baseline mean 0.91 0.87 3.94 3.52 0.00 0.85
Ghana -0.011 0.005 -0.01 0.05 0.02
(0.027) (0.014) (0.047) (0.055) (0.024)
Observations 2215 2291 2287 2292 2291
R-Squared 0.071 0.204 0.087 0.110 0.130
Control mean 0.68 0.88 3.06 0.00 0.29
Baseline mean 0.71 0.88 2.61 0.00 0.00
Honduras 0.002 0.000 0.067 0.051 0.13***
(0.016) (0.008) (0.051) (0.054) (0.042)
Observations 4389 3867 3866 3864 3867
R-squared 0.017 0.11 0.040 0.054 0.057
Control mean 0.800 0.89 3.260 3.25 0.000
Baseline mean 0.96 0.67 3.34 0.000
India (Bandhan) -0.037 0.013 0.033 0.049 -0.0026 0.01
(0.034) (0.014) (0.027) (0.036) (0.054) (0.024)
Observations 1611 1760 1759 1759 1760 1760
R-squared 0.22 0.29 0.18 0.15 0.18 0.21
Control mean 0.69 0.64 2.55 2.77 0.00 0.69
Baseline mean 0.02 0.60 2.31 1.66 0.02 0.80
Pakistan 0.004 -0.013 0.053
(0.019) (0.048) (0.043)
Observations 2311 2305 2309
R-squared 0.079 0.057 0.050
Control mean 0.76 3.40 3.74
Baseline mean 0.56 2.86
Peru 0.023 0.012 0.11*** 0.15*** 0.12**
(0.020) (0.017) (0.044) (0.043) (0.049)
Observations 2,825 2,905 2,905 2,905 2,905
R-squared 0.029 0.083 0.127 0.103 0.051
Control mean 0.800 0.660 2.570 2.710 0.000
Baseline mean 0.940 0.670 2.610 2.600 0.000
Physical Health Mental Health
Notes:
1. Results presented are intent-to-treat estimates, including controls for the household's value at baseline and controls for every variable used in block 
stratification and in re-randomization procedures
2. See SOM Table 1 for the components included in the Activities of Daily Living Score and the absence of symptoms of mental distress index.
3. In Ghana, the adult survey was asked exclusively to women. In other sites, adult survey was asked to both men and women.
Table S5h-1: Political Involvement and Women's Empowerment by Country, Endline 1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)














major say on 
food decisions
Woman has 




















Ethiopia 0.044* 0.036 -0.0074 -0.026 -0.0086 -0.013 0.028 -0.011
(0.024) (0.024) (0.023) (0.029) (0.028) (0.029) (0.026) (0.026)
Observations 1,536 1,537 1,537 874 855 874 873 863
R-squared 0.072 0.063 0.050 0.14 0.34 0.29 0.39 0.38
Control mean 0.35 0.61 0.300 0.73 0.49 0.56 0.41 0.400
Baseline mean 0.30 0.35 0.18 0.48 0.41 0.45 0.41 0.38
Ghana 0.089*** 0.007 0.039 0.006 0.04
(0.027) (0.028) (0.028) (0.027) (0.026)
Observations 2335 2319 2266 2617 2264
R-squared 0.13 0.09 0.09 0.07 0.17
Control mean 0.57 0.51 0.37 0.58 0.410
Baseline mean 0.55 0.45 0.33 0.50 0.36
Honduras -0.01 -0.011* 0.0079 0.0290 0.0007 0.039* -0.014
(0.018) (0.007) (0.020) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.025)
Observations 3720 2182 3998 2174 2169 2173 2170
R-squared 0.053 0.028 0.034 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.12
Control mean 0.28 0.02 0.49 0.67 0.67 0.68 0.41
Baseline mean 0.20 0.10 0.190 0.17 0.190 0.12
India (Bandhan) -0.025 0.031 0.021 0.020 0.025 0.018 0.015
(0.018) (0.024) (0.018) (0.015) (0.017) (0.015) (0.014)
Observations 1505 1505 1505 1505 1505 1505 1505
R-squared 0.29 0.14 0.11 0.15 0.13 0.12 0.13
Control mean 0.82 0.35 0.093 0.072 0.075 0.059 0.053
Baseline mean 0.75 0.43 0.19 0.13 0.18 0.18 0.11
Pakistan 0.13*** 0.015 0.010 0.056*** 0.059*** 0.050*** 0.049***
(0.021) (0.014) (0.012) (0.018) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016)
Observations 2630 2664 2657 1429 1316 1421 1418
R-squared 0.17 0.079 0.059 0.16 0.17 0.196 0.201
Control mean 0.27 0.13 0.087 0.13 0.098 0.10 0.098
Baseline mean 0.17 0.27 0.28 0.23 0.17 0.16 0.14
Peru 0.0076 -0.0048 0.017 -0.0220 -0.007 -0.006 0.008
(0.012) (0.0084) -0.020 (0.018) (0.022) (0.021) (0.024)
Observations 3078 3078 3078 1725 1705 1726 1719
R-squared 0.04 0.041 0.07 0.058 0.095 0.081 0.081
Control mean 0.91 0.044 0.33 0.90 0.83 0.85 0.76
Baseline mean 0.007 0.21
Notes:
1. Results presented are intent-to-treat estimates, including controls for the household's value at baseline and controls for every variable used in block stratification and in re-randomization procedures
2. In Ghana, the adult survey was asked exclusively to women. In other sites, adult survey was asked to both men and women.
Political Involvement Women's Empowerment
Table S5h-2: Political Involvement and Women's Empowerment by Country, Endline 2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)














major say on 
food decisions
Woman has 




















Ethiopia 0.054** 0.052** 0.0078 0.025 -0.011 -0.0087 -0.0076 -0.020
(0.025) (0.026) (0.021) (0.028) (0.029) (0.030) (0.028) (0.029)
Observations 1,471 1,468 1,471 819 823 835 832 758
R-squared 0.060 0.057 0.063 0.090 0.29 0.26 0.35 0.36
Control mean 0.33 0.52 0.22 0.78 0.49 0.56 0.45 0.39
Baseline mean 0.300 0.35 0.18 0.48 0.41 0.45 0.41 0.38
Ghana 0.049* -0.048* 0.03 0.03 0.03
(0.028) (0.026) (0.024) (0.026) (0.028)
Observations 2294 2272 2220 2617 2195
R-Squared 0.12 0.14 0.11 0.10 0.08
Control mean 0.450 0.370 0.230 0.440 0.280
Baseline mean 0.55 0.45 0.33 0.50 0.36
Honduras -0.032* 0.0071 0.017 -0.0072 0.0170 0.001 -0.0059
(0.019) (0.015) (0.020) (0.021) (0.022) (0.020) (0.026)
Observations 3618 2141 3867 2136 2136 2136 2134
R-squared 0.058 0.040 0.043 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.07
Control mean 0.32 0.087 0.42 0.83 0.78 0.83 0.60
Baseline mean 0.20 0.095 0.19 0.17 0.19 0.12




Control mean 0.48 0.44
Baseline mean 0.75 0.43
Pakistan 0.065*** 0.011 0.019 0.007 0.032 0.023 0.025
(0.019) (0.017) (0.013) (0.023) (0.021) (0.019) (0.019)
Observations 2307 2312 2311 1272 1084 1269 1267
R-squared 0.18 0.093 0.061 0.19 0.19 0.23 0.20
Control mean 0.21 0.17 0.10 0.26 0.15 0.15 0.13
Baseline mean 0.17 0.27 0.28 0.23 0.17 0.16 0.14
Peru -0.013 -0.0140 0.030 0.034* -0.021 0.020 0.0200
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
Observations 2906 2905 2906 1619 1610 1617 1614
R-squared 0.034 0.063 0.071 0.083 0.087 0.102 0.125
Control mean 0.910 0.190 0.260 0.890 0.820 0.850 0.760
Baseline mean 0.000 0.007 0.210
Notes:
1. Results presented are intent-to-treat estimates, including controls for the household's value at baseline and controls for every variable used in both block stratification and in re-randomization procedures
2. In Ghana, the adult survey was asked exclusively to women. In other sites, adult survey was asked to both men and women.
Political Involvement Women's Empowerment
























q-value for all 
10 hypotheses
Total per capita consumption, standardized 0.050* 0.092 0.085** 0.045 0.050* 0.101 0.036 0.456
(0.028) (0.036) (0.028) (0.035)
Food security index (5 components) 0.075*** 0.013 0.017 0.856 0.072** 0.017 -0.059 0.456
(0.028) (0.042) (0.028) (0.043)
Asset index 0.118*** 0.001 0.111*** 0.011 0.116*** 0.001 -0.017 0.682
(0.028) (0.037) (0.028) (0.033)
Financial inclusion index (4 components) 0.156*** 0.001 0.175*** 0.001 0.156*** 0.001 0.024 0.603
(0.031) (0.036) (0.032) (0.034)
Total time spent working, standardized 0.047** 0.062 0.006 0.873 0.048** 0.06 -0.035 0.456
(0.023) (0.037) (0.023) (0.035)
Incomes and revenues index (5 components) 0.176*** 0.001 0.072* 0.148 0.174*** 0.001 -0.094** 0.176
(0.028) (0.040) (0.029) (0.039)
Physical health index (3 components) 0.082*** 0.003 0.019 0.731 0.084*** 0.002 -0.062** 0.192
(0.025) (0.029) (0.025) (0.030)
Mental health index (3 components) 0.118*** 0.001 0.107*** 0.004 0.115*** 0.001 -0.005 0.868
(0.027) (0.032) (0.027) (0.031)
Political Involvement index (4 components) 0.028 0.284 -0.009 0.863 0.029 0.266 -0.048 0.456
(0.025) (0.032) (0.025) (0.037)
Women's empowerment index (5 components) 0.018 0.559 0.064 0.192 0.018 0.568 0.045 0.456
(0.031) (0.041) (0.031) (0.040)
Notes:
1. Results presented are mean standardized intent-to-treat estimates, including country dummies, controls for the household's value at baseline and controls for every variable used in both 
block stratification and in re-randomization procedures
2. Dummy variables are included for Endline 1 regressions of whether the data used includes each wave of short survey data
3. In Column 1, standard errors are clustered at the "randomization unit", ie at the household level for households in treatment villages, but at the village level for those in pure control 
villages. In Columns 3 and 7, standard errors are clustered at the village level. In column 5, standard errors are clustered at the household level.
4. See SOM Text 2 for the components of each index
Table S6a: Spillover Effects in Endline 1, Ghana, Honduras and Peru
Treatment households vs. 
households in control 
communities
Within village comparison: 
treatment households vs. 
control households within 
treatment villages
Spillovers: control 
households in treatment 
communities vs. control 
communities
Treatment households vs. all 
control households



























q-value for all 
10 hypotheses
Total per capita consumption, standardized 0.048 0.156 0.06 0.276 0.048 0.154 0.003 0.97
(0.030) (0.037) (0.030) (0.035)
Food security index (5 components) 0.076*** 0.012 0.054 0.493 0.074*** 0.015 -0.026 0.877
(0.027) (0.051) (0.027) (0.052)
Asset index 0.093*** 0.003 0.074** 0.147 0.092*** 0.004 -0.035 0.776
(0.028) (0.037) (0.028) (0.035)
Financial inclusion index (4 components) 0.143*** 0.001 0.190*** 0.001 0.142*** 0.001 0.028 0.858
(0.038) (0.043) (0.039) (0.036)
Total time spent working, standardized 0.015 0.599 0.023 0.721 0.013 0.662 0.001 0.97
(0.025) (0.038) (0.025) (0.038)
Incomes and revenues index (5 components) 0.224*** 0.001 0.210*** 0.001 0.222*** 0.001 -0.018 0.877
(0.036) (0.044) (0.036) (0.032)
Physical health index (3 components) 0.047* 0.134 -0.016 0.721 0.046* 0.142 -0.057* 0.229
(0.027) (0.029) (0.027) (0.030)
Mental health index (3 components) 0.109*** 0.001 -0.004 0.997 0.109*** 0.001 -0.108*** 0.062
(0.028) (0.038) (0.028) (0.039)
Political Involvement index (4 components) 0.007 0.787 0.000 0.997 0.006 0.819 -0.012 0.963
(0.026) (0.041) (0.027) (0.041)
Women's empowerment index (5 components) 0.028 0.491 -0.046 0.493 0.025 0.561 -0.076* 0.229
(0.032) (0.041) (0.033) (0.042)
Notes:
1. Results presented are mean standardized intent-to-treat estimates, including country dummies, controls for the household's value at baseline and controls for every variable used in both 
block stratification and in re-randomization procedures
2. In Column 1, standard errors are clustered at the "randomization unit", ie at the household level for households in treatment villages, but at the village level for those in pure control 
villages. In Columns 3 and 7, standard errors are clustered at the village level. In column 5, standard errors are clustered at the household level.
3. See SOM Text 2 for the components of each index
Table S6b: Spillover Effects in Endline 2, Ghana, Honduras and Peru
Treatment households vs. all 
control households
Treatment households vs. 
households in control 
communities
Within village comparison: 
treatment households vs. 
control households within 
treatment villages
Spillovers: control 
households in treatment 
communities vs. control 
communities
Table S7: Program Costs per Participant, USD Exchange Rates 2014
Ethiopia Ghana Honduras India Pakistan Peru
Direct Transfer Costs 360 311 381 199 461 596
Asset Cost 360 206 283 124 235 464
Food stipend 0 105 98 75 205 131
Total supervision costs 557 1294 860 116 - 1826
        Salaries of Implementing Organization Staff 102 911 422 84 - 1347
        Materials 10 55 59 0 - 30
        Training 249 20 64 5 - 60
        Travel Costs 51 134 111 5 - 30
        Other Supervision Expenses 145 175 204 21 - 359
Total Direct Costs 918 1605 1241 315 1054 2421
    Start-up expenses 13 61 55 11 - 25
    Indirect Costs 123 469 110 32 106 251
Total Costs, calculated as if all incurred immediately at beginning of Year 0 1054 2135 1406 358 1160 2697
Total Costs, Inflated to Year 3 at 5% annual discount rate 1220 2472 1627 414 1343 3122
Notes: 
This tables presents the same information as Panel A of Table 4 in the main tables. It instead presents the information in exchange rate terms, to provide a better sense to potential 
implementing agencies of the costs associated with this program.
The implementing partner in Honduras initially allocated all start-up costs and indirect costs into their direct supervision line items. We assume 5% of costs were committed to 
start-up, and 10% to indirect costs, while preserving the total costs equal to the organization's full budget for the project. In Pakistan, there were five implementing partners, each 
with different allocations of the non-direct costs. The total represents the average across these organizations. In India, note that the compliance rate was 51.5%; the costs above 
are total program costs divided by number of participants that received treatment, not number of participants that were offered treatment, thus providing a conservatve estimate for 
the benefit-cost ratio.
Table S8: Asset Robustness Check
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Correlation: 
Reported Asset 
Value and Asset 
Index
Correlation: Asset 
Value and Asset 
Index, using values 
only from other sites
Correlation: Actual 
value and asset 
indices of indices 
held in multiple 
sites, using only 




Value and Asset 
Index
Correlation: Asset 
Value and Asset 
Index, using values 
only from other sites
Correlation: Actual 
value and asset 
indices of indices 
held in multiple 
sites, using only 
asset values from 
other sites
Ethiopia 0.833 0.810 0.851 0.875 0.847 0.873
Honduras 0.872 0.712 0.759 0.865 0.682 0.789
Pakistan N/A N/A N/A 0.958 0.774 0.772
Peru 0.988 0.890 0.908 0.935 0.805 0.869
Endline 1 Endline 2
Notes:
(1) See SOM Text 1 Assets section for an explanation of how the asset index is constructed.
(2) Columns 1 and 4 show the correlation between asset value and asset index for the four countries where we have asset value information.
(3) Columns 2 and 5 show the correlation between asset value and asset index, if we were to only use price information from the other countries when 
constructing this index. It provides an estimate of how accurate each country's asset index would be at predicting the country's true asset value if price 
information for that country were not available.
(4) Columns 3 and 6 provide a second test of the information provided in columns 2 and 5. It again shows how closely the true asset value is correlated with 
asset indices constructed without price information from that country's site. In this case, asset value is calculated using only assets held in multiple 
countries. It therefore shows accurate the other countries' relative asset values are at predicting the same sorts of assets for the country in question.

















*SS = Short Survey. Only short surveys that occurred within 12 months of endline 1 are used in endline 1 analysis (ie, SS2 and SS3).  


















*SS = Short Survey. Only short surveys that occurred within 12 months of endline 1 are used in endline 1 analysis (ie, SS4 & SS5). Consumption support amount 
based on six months of food consumption (in line with other countries) but distributed all at once rather than slowly over time as done in other countries. 




























Per Capita Food Consumption
Per Capita Non-Food Consumption
Food Security Index
Household Gets Enough Food
No Adults Skipped Meal
No Adults Went Whole Day Without Food
No Children Skipped Meals








Amount Deposited Into Savings
Total Time Spent Working
Time Spent Working, Agriculture




Perception of Economic Status
Physical Health Index
Activities of Daily Living Score
Mental Health Index
Perception of Status In Life
Lack of Stress Index
Political Index
Member Of Political Party
Attended Community Meeting
Women's Decision-Making Index
Major Say in Education Expenditures
Major Say in Health Expenditures
Major Say in Home Improvement Expenditures




Time Spent Working, Microenterprise
Time Spent Working, Paid Labor
Paid Labor Income
Did Not Miss Work Due To Illness
Perception of Health Status
Did Not Experience Worry
Voted In Last Election
Met with Local Leader
Major Say in Food Expenditures
Major Say in Business Management
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Effect size in standard deviations of the control group
This figure summarizes the treatment effects presented in Tables S2a- S2h. Here, treatment effects on continuous variables are presented in standard deviation units.
Each line shows the OLS point estimate and 95% confidence interval for that outcome.









Total asset value index
Financial inclusion index
Total time use index
Income and revenue
Total consumption index














Total asset value index
Financial inclusion index





Total asset value index
Political involvement index
Women's decision-making index









Total time use index
Women's decision-making index
Total consumption index
















-0.6 -0.4 -0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2.0 2.2
Effect size in standard deviations of the control group
This figure summarizes the treatment effects presented in Appendix Tables S3a-S3f. Here, all treatment effects are presented as standardized z-score indices.
Each line shows the standardized index outcome and its 95% confidence interval.
Figure S3: Average Intent-to-Treat Effects by Country, Endline 1 at a Glance
